An economic expert reveals a roadmap for freeing Iraqi funds from the grip of the US Federal Reserve.
On Friday, economist Nabil Al-Marousmi revealed several solutions and proposals to free Iraqi funds from the control of the US Federal Reserve. The video for this My FX Buddies Blog is below here:
Al-Marsoumi said in a post followed by “Al-Ahd News”: “The United States has effectively controlled Iraqi oil revenues since 2003 through its management via the Federal Reserve. The United Nations had provided legal protection for these funds under Resolution 1483, until it was terminated in 2011, following the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1956.” He added that "the US president issued Executive Order 13303 to protect Iraqi funds, an order that remains in effect today despite some amendments." He explained that "the objectives of US protection of Iraqi funds are to safeguard them from compensation claims by companies and individuals, as well as to prevent the seizure of Iraqi assets in cases filed since the 1990s." He emphasized that "despite the expiration of many of the legal reasons that necessitated this financial arrangement, Iraq remains subject to strict financial oversight by Washington, which differs from the usual procedures in the international banking system."
Al-Marsoumi pointed out that “most oil-producing countries deposit their money in the US Federal Reserve because oil is sold in dollars, but Iraq suffers from complete dependence on oil revenues without alternative resources,” explaining that “this means that the problem is not in depositing money with the US Federal Reserve, but rather in the restrictions imposed on the ability to dispose of it freely, unlike what other countries enjoy.” He continued: “It is known that there are cases filed against Iraq by dozens or hundreds of companies that were harmed by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and representatives of Iraq did not attend the court sessions at the time to defend or reduce the compensations, and therefore the courts issued default judgments for very high amounts.” He noted that “linking the issue of protecting Iraqi funds from prosecution to America gives Washington great influence over Baghdad, and resolving the crisis requires a political decision, as happened with Greece and Argentina, by employing a reputable law firm that is given full powers, whose task will be to accurately inventory the cases filed against Iraq and how much money has been awarded in judgments.” Al-Marsoumi concluded that “Iraq is unable to resort to the courts because the judgments have become final, so a deal can be reached with the beneficiaries to drop the lawsuits in exchange for giving them a percentage of the money, which is called buying the debts, and most likely they will accept because they will get money instead of waiting and possibly not getting anything.”
The government sets a timetable for preparing the draft budget.
Kujer told Al-Furat News Agency that “the government’s job since August has been to request the initial documents from the administrative units in the ministries and governorates, with the draft to be sent in mid-October 2025.”
He added that "in any case, the 2026 budget draft must be prepared by the government."
What is the cost of rebellion?
Learn about the reasons for America's "guardianship" over Iraq... and the consequences that await us if this protection is lifted.
Despite more than 23 years having passed since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraqi oil revenues remain channeled through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This arrangement is viewed within Iraq as a complex mix of legal "protection" and financial "guardianship" that grants Washington significant influence over economic decision-making in Baghdad. Although most of the legal foundations that originally established this mechanism have expired, the United States effectively still controls the flow of dollars that fund the Iraqi budget through a combination of executive orders, protectionist measures, and strict oversight of dollar flows into and out of Iraq. With Trump's threats to cut "aid" to Iraq—which is practically understood as a threat to cut off its dollar supply—let's examine the implications.
What if Trump carries out his threat and cuts off or reduces dollar aid to Iraq?
-Financial strangulation within weeks: because almost every artery in the economy runs through the dollar coming out of New York, and any significant reduction or cut in supply would cripple the central bank’s ability to finance the market.
What we are currently experiencing has escalated into a full-blown crisis: today, with only limited supply constraints and exchange rate fluctuations, markets are in turmoil and prices are soaring. What will happen if the cuts become more drastic or if the currency freeze becomes a declared political decision?
- Direct pressure on the central bank and the government: The central bank will find itself facing practically frozen reserves, unable to inject sufficient quantities to maintain the official exchange rate or cover imports, and the government will be forced to choose between:
1- Employee salaries.
2-Financing food, medicine, and energy.
3- The gap between the official and parallel exchange rates has exploded.
This means a rapid erosion of the purchasing power of salaries, a significant rise in the prices of basic commodities, an expansion of hoarding in dollars and gold, and perhaps a return to barter patterns in some sectors.
- Widespread paralysis in the private sector and foreign trade: letters of credit and transfers have stopped, shipments are delayed, and weak companies are leaving the market in favor of a few who own private channels to obtain hard currency.
-The impossibility of a rapid transition to alternative currencies: Even if Iraq were to consider the yuan, the ruble, or regional settlements in other currencies, this is a project that would require years to amend contracts and supply chains, and it cannot be accomplished as an emergency solution under pressure within months.
-A potential social and political explosion: The collapse of purchasing power, rising unemployment, and shortages of goods could turn into a wave of protests and unrest, which could be exploited by internal and external forces to rearrange influence within the country.
-Turning Iraq into an arena for settling scores: Cutting off or strangling the dollar will be used as a tool in the American-Iranian conflict, and perhaps in wider conflicts, turning Iraq from a player trying to balance its relations into an open arena for the rivalries of others.
-The current crisis is just a small "rehearsal": What is happening today in terms of pressures, partial reductions, and tightening of controls reveals the fragility of the financial and monetary structure, and shows what the image of a "complete financial blockade" could look like if the threat turns into a strategic decision.
The question is: Why is Iraq still mortgaging its oil revenues to America?
From the "Development Fund for Iraq" to the Central Bank account in New York
Economic expert Nabil Al-Marsoumi presents an analysis that moves from legal backgrounds to the financial reality today, and then proposes a practical path to get out of the state of dependency, by addressing the file of lawsuits and compensations accumulated against Iraq since the nineties, instead of just complaining about the “dominance” of the US Federal Reserve.
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority established the "Development Fund for Iraq" to be the repository for oil and gas export revenues, obligating countries around the world to deposit the sales proceeds into it, based on Security Council Resolution 1483, which stipulated that oil revenues be transferred to this fund and used for reconstruction, and protected from seizure and litigation proceedings abroad.
In 2010, UN Security Council Resolution 1956 paved the way for the dissolution of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and the transfer of management of the funds to the Iraqi government and the Central Bank of Iraq, while maintaining some legal protections for a specified period. Concurrently, former US President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13303 in 2003, which granted special protection to the DFI and "all property in which Iraq has an interest," treating them as US funds with respect to immunity from seizure and court orders. This order remains in effect today, with some amendments, and is the most important legal basis for protecting Iraqi funds within the US financial system.
In practice, the “Development Fund for Iraq” evolved into an account in the name of the Central Bank of Iraq at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, into which almost all crude oil revenues were transferred. The Central Bank then recycled these proceeds back into the country by selling dollars to banks, financing imports, and supporting the exchange rate.
Why does the depositing continue at the Federal Reserve while other oil-producing countries do the same thing without restrictions?
Technically, having oil revenues in the US Federal Reserve is not unusual; many oil-producing countries prefer to deposit their reserves there because oil is priced and sold in dollars, and because holding dollar reserves in New York gives these countries quick and secure access to the global financial system. However, Iraq's situation is different for two main reasons:
-Absolute dependence on oil and the dollar: More than 90% of public revenues come from oil sales, making the Federal Reserve account the "bottleneck" for all hard currency entering the Iraqi budget.
- Exceptional oversight of dollar transactions: For years, and especially after 2022, the US Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department have tightened controls on transfers leaving Iraq's account, linking dollar allocations to Iraqi banks' adherence to a strict compliance system to prevent currency smuggling to Iran and other sanctioned countries. This included banning 14 Iraqi banks from dealing in dollars and subsequently preventing additional banks from conducting dollar transfers, citing weak anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing controls.
The result, as summarized by Al-Marsoumi, is that the problem is not in the "place" of depositing the funds, but in the type of restrictions imposed on Iraq's freedom to use them compared to other countries; many oil-producing countries deposit their funds in the Federal Reserve, but they do not face the same level of scrutiny and restriction on every bank transfer.
Old lawsuits: The Kuwait invasion bill that has not been fully settled
A significant part of the complexity of the situation is linked to a long history of lawsuits filed against Iraq stemming from its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The United Nations Compensation Commission was established to receive claims from affected countries, companies, and individuals, and to disburse compensation from Iraqi oil revenues for many years. Although the compensation file for Kuwait was declared closed in 2022 after full payment, other cases and compensation claims filed by companies and private parties in various international and national courts remain, some resulting in substantial default judgments due to the lack of effective Iraqi legal representation.
These provisions make Iraqi assets a constant target for seizure attempts by creditors. This is why the American protection (Resolution 13303) was originally used to prevent the seizure of Iraq’s assets in New York, but linking the protection to an American presidential decision put Iraq at the mercy of the political will in Washington: if the protection is lifted without addressing the claims and debts, the assets are at risk of almost immediate seizure in more than one jurisdiction.
From here, Al-Marsoumi points out that protecting funds through the United States gives Washington great influence over Baghdad; because whoever has the "button" of protection, consequently has the ability to threaten Baghdad with losing part of its assets if it deviates from the path required by America.
Direct political influence: When assets become a weapon in negotiations
American control is not limited to the technical procedures of banks; it also manifests as a tool of political pressure. Numerous reports indicate that, amidst discussions about the future of the American military presence in Iraq, US officials have threatened to restrict Baghdad's access to its funds held at the Federal Reserve. This would effectively cripple the government's ability to pay salaries and finance imports within weeks if implemented.
This influence was further strengthened by tightening the noose on the smuggling routes of dollars to Iran and the factions close to it, whether through the currency auction, which was subjected to severe restrictions and later was gradually dismantled, or through pursuing new channels such as international payment cards that were used for transfers and smuggling, before the noose was also tightened on them.
For Iraq, this means that the financial file is no longer governed solely by the necessities of economic stability, but also by the balances of the American-Iranian conflict; whenever the confrontation between the two sides intensifies, the pressure on the dollar increases within Iraq, and the presence of the US Federal Reserve increases as the "oxygen cutter" for the Iraqi economy if necessary.
The cost of the current arrangement on the Iraqi economy
The existing arrangement produces a range of profound effects on daily economic life in Iraq, most notably:
-Parallel market and two dollar exchange rates: Reducing the amount of dollars allowed to be injected into banks and tightening the conditions for transfers pushes a large part of trade into the informal market, where the dollar is sold at a higher price than the official rate, which raises the cost of imports, goods and food.
- Strangling the private sector: Importing companies that cannot meet the requirements of the US-Iraqi regulatory platforms are forced to resort to the parallel market, incurring additional costs, or exit the market in favor of "protected" players who have their own channels to access the dollar.
-Politicizing the economy: Any political disagreement with Washington, or a hardening of the relationship with Iran, is directly reflected in the flow of dollars into Iraq, turning fiscal policy into a geopolitical battleground, not just an economic management tool.
Deepening dependence on oil: As long as all funding lines pass through the Federal Reserve and oil revenues, any drop in global prices or disruption in the oil market reopens the debate on the deficit, while non-oil revenues remain weak and squandered by corruption, tax evasion, and customs fraud.
What does Nabil Al-Marsoumi propose to escape this "guardianship trap"?
Al-Marsoumi proposed a different approach that went beyond simply complaining about Iraq's subservience to the US federal system; it addressed the legal root of the crisis. His idea can be summarized in three interconnected steps:
A comprehensive review of the lawsuits and debts file: This involves commissioning a reputable international law firm with full authority to conduct a thorough inventory of all cases filed against Iraq in foreign courts, including the amounts awarded, the nature of the judgments, and their binding nature.
Shifting from a passive defense to active negotiation: Given that many judgments have become final and cannot be easily overturned, the realistic option is to enter into negotiations with creditors (companies, individuals, and institutions) to reach settlements through a "debt buyout" approach: paying a percentage of the amount in exchange for dropping the lawsuits or halting the pursuit of Iraqi assets.
A political, not just economic, decision: Al-Marsoumi points out that countries like Greece and Argentina only overcame their crises with creditors through a major political decision, not just financial maneuvering. They negotiated significant debt reductions and long-term rescheduling in exchange for a commitment to a specific reform plan. By this measure, Iraq needs a sovereign decision that adopts a courageous legal and negotiating strategy to address the lawsuits file, rather than leaving it unresolved, which perpetuates American protection and its associated influence.
In this sense, addressing the issue of debts and claims becomes a necessary condition for freeing funds from the American "protection trusteeship"; because any sudden withdrawal from the current protection system, without cleaning up this file, means opening the door to a wave of judicial seizure of Iraqi assets abroad.
What are Iraq's realistic options in the coming years?
The question is not, "Should we leave the Federal Reserve or stay?" but rather, "How can we reduce the Federal Reserve's influence over Iraqi financial decisions and transform its role from a tool of guardianship into a temporary safety net?" A range of overlapping options can be outlined:
Internal reforms to reduce Washington's appetite for intervention: As compliance systems in Iraqi banks improve and dollar smuggling and money laundering are curbed, the objective need for intervention by the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury Department under the pretext of protecting the financial system from exploitation diminishes.
Gradually diversify reserves and deposit destinations: Without taking any sudden risks, the Central Bank can gradually expand its currency basket and the destinations for its reserve investments (euro, yuan, gold, sovereign assets), thereby reducing some of the political pressures associated with dollar exclusivity, while the dollar remains a pivotal currency for trade.
Increase the weight of non-oil revenues: Addressing tax and customs evasion and corruption at border crossings, and fairly expanding the income and consumption tax base, means that a larger portion of state funding will no longer be held hostage to a single account in New York. This would reduce Washington's ability to financially strangle Iraq.
Address the issue of lawsuits as proposed by the two decrees: inventory, negotiation, settlements, and then a legal-political understanding with the United States to gradually reduce protection in exchange for guarantees against the prosecution of Iraqi assets.
A balance between sovereignty and realism
Realistically, it does not appear that Iraq is able, in the short term, to sever its oil revenues from the US Federal Reserve with a single blow. The global financial structure, the almost complete dependence on oil and the dollar, and the issue of debts and lawsuits make this option a high-cost gamble, especially if the potential effects of any strict US move are taken into account, such as reducing dollar flows or threatening to cut them off completely, with the direct risks this entails for salaries, prices, the ability to finance imports, and the stability of the market and the street together.
But in the medium term, this “forced linkage” could turn into an intentional transitional phase, if work is carried out on three simultaneous tracks: restructuring debts and claims as the decree suggests, reforming the banking system and reducing dollar smuggling and enhancing compliance, and building internal sources of economic strength outside of oil, which would gradually mitigate the impact of any American shock on hard currency flows.
Only then can the question "Why does the US Federal Reserve control Iraqi funds?" be transformed from an expression of structural weakness into a political and economic negotiation file in which Iraq possesses real cards of strength, and at the same time reduces the cost and depth of the effects that may result from any US decision to tighten the noose on the dollar, instead of the country remaining hostage to a single account in New York that reduces the entire state to a dollar balance.
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Between "text" and "reality": Postponing the presidential election puts the Iraqi constitution to the test of time limits.
With the postponement of the parliamentary session scheduled to elect the president, the current crisis transcends the bounds of a mere political procedure, opening a deeper debate about the constitution's place in the Iraqi equation and the extent to which the timeframes it stipulates for the transfer of power are respected. The constitutional deadline for electing the president has once again become a flexible detail in the bargaining arena between political forces, while the text itself is relegated to the realm of theoretical reference. Considerations of "consensus" and "political restructuring" take precedence over adherence to binding deadlines, in a scenario that reproduces the unwritten norms accumulated during previous parliamentary sessions, norms that allow for the obstruction of entitlements whenever they clash with the calculations of the political blocs.
The Iraqi Constitution, in Article (72/Second/B), stipulates that the President of the Republic must be elected within (30) days of the first session of the new Parliament, to ensure the continuity of legitimacy and prevent a power vacuum. However, practical experience since 2005 has established a pattern of exceeding these deadlines under the pretexts of "lack of quorum" or "the need for more time to reach an understanding." This has gradually created a situation resembling a parallel "political custom" and "constitutional custom," where deadlines are treated as subject to postponement and flexibility as dictated by the balance of power and the deals of the moment. With each new postponement, the impression is reinforced that the "political deal" holds greater authority than the constitutional text, and that deadlines can be suspended as long as an agreement has not yet been finalized behind closed doors.
In this context, legal and political affairs expert Ali Habib warned that violating the constitutional deadlines set for electing the president of the republic "is a clear violation of the provisions of the constitution and directly affects the legitimacy of the entire political process," warning of "serious legal and political repercussions that may extend to the work of all constitutional authorities."
Habib told Baghdad Today that “the Iraqi constitution has set clear time limits for completing constitutional entitlements, foremost among them the election of the president of the republic, with the aim of ensuring a smooth transfer of power and preventing a constitutional vacuum. Exceeding these time limits without constitutional justifications is considered a violation of the principle of the supremacy of the constitution and a weakening of the prestige of the constitutional text.”
He explained that "the legal implications of this violation are represented in the possibility of challenging the legitimacy of subsequent procedures, especially those related to the appointment of the Prime Minister and the formation of the government. The continuation of this violation places the Supreme Federal Court in front of a sensitive interpretive responsibility, and may open the door to accumulated constitutional crises that will be difficult to contain later."
On the political level, the expert in legal and political affairs warned that “obstructing the election of the President of the Republic perpetuates the state of political deadlock and deepens the loss of confidence among political forces, in addition to its negative impact on internal stability and the image of the political process in front of local and international public opinion, and the continuation of constitutional violations reinforces the logic of political norms at the expense of legal texts.”
While calls are increasing to respect constitutional deadlines and not turn them into mere “flexible recommendations” subject to the fluctuations of understandings, observers believe that the accumulation of these violations turns the crisis of electing the president of the republic into a repeated model of a broader crisis between “text” and “reality,” where the supremacy of the constitution recedes in the face of customs formed from precedents of postponement and temporary settlements, with the accompanying risks to the stability of the political system and the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of its institutions.
Savaya responds to news of his dismissal
On Friday (January 30, 2026), Ambreen Zaman, senior correspondent for Al-Monitor, confirmed that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya denied the circulating news about his dismissal from his position, explaining that what has happened so far is limited to closing his account on the X platform, without any official explanation regarding the reasons for that action.
Zaman said in a statement published on her “X” account and followed by “Baghdad Today”, that she had contacted Savaya directly, who denied all the news circulating about his removal from his mission, indicating that this news is being promoted by “accounts linked to Iranian-backed factions”, in an attempt to create a media impression of the absence of the American envoy from the Iraqi scene.
She added that Savaya explained to her that he was still completing the administrative procedures for his mission, and that this process was expected to end soon, which means that he will continue to be officially assigned the Iraq file by the US administration, despite the controversy raised by the recent rumors.
Zaman’s denial came after a wide wave of posts on the “X” website that spoke during the past hours and days about Savaya’s “dismissal” from his position, based on the closure of his page on the platform, without the US State Department or the White House announcing any official decision in this regard, which reinforced the state of ambiguity before his remaining in his position was reaffirmed through press statements.
It is worth noting that American and international media reports had previously indicated that the White House and American officials also denied the circulating news about Savaya’s removal, confirming that he would continue to be assigned as a special envoy to Iraq, at a time when the Iraqi file is facing an escalation in mutual pressures between Washington and the factions close to Iran.
Parliament sets next Sunday as the date for the session to elect the President of the Republic
link
The media department of the House of Representatives announced today, Friday, that next Sunday has been set as the date for holding a session to elect the President of the Republic.
Department of Affairs
Parliamentary Session
Recitation of verses from the Holy Quran
First: Taking of the constitutional oath by some members of parliament.
Second: Election of the President of the Republic.
The agenda is below but it's not showing
Al-Maliki discusses with the US chargé d'affaires the formation of the remaining presidencies and the path of the new government.
Another Headline
Iraqi-American talks on forming a government
On Friday (January 30, 2026), Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, received Joshua Harris, the Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Iraq, and discussed with him ways to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries, in addition to discussing the ongoing dialogues between political forces regarding the completion of the formation of the remaining presidencies.
A statement from al-Maliki’s office, received by “Baghdad Today”, stated that the meeting addressed “the vision of the coordination framework for the next government’s path,” and the file of ongoing dialogues between political forces, particularly regarding the selection of the President of the Republic and the Speaker of Parliament, and establishing the features of the government program for the next stage, in line with the requirements of political, security and economic stability in the country.
This meeting comes at a time when the Iraqi political scene is witnessing intense activity between the forces of the Coordination Framework and its allies, and the Kurdish and Sunni forces, to resolve the issue of the presidencies and arrange the balance of power within the parliament and the government, in parallel with increasing talk of direct American pressure in the process of forming the new government.
The meeting also intersects with the positions of political forces, including the Iraqi Communist Party, which warned against "blatant foreign interference" in the government formation process and linked this to the continuation of the quota system approach, which puts influential forces, including the State of Law Coalition, before a test of balancing openness to dialogue with Washington on the one hand, and maintaining the discourse of protecting sovereignty and independent national decision on the other.
Following al-Maliki's refusal, the US chargé d'affaires visited al-Halbousi's office.
A discussion about a government that enjoys national support.
On Friday, Mohammed al-Halbousi, head of the Progress Party, discussed with Joshua Harris, the US Chargé d'Affaires to Iraq, the developments in the political situation in the country, the ongoing dialogues to elect a president, and the formation of a government capable of facing the challenges and enjoying national support.
Al-Halbousi’s office stated in a statement, a copy of which was received by 964 Network , that “the head of the Progress Party, Muhammad al-Halbousi, received today, Friday, the Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy in Iraq, Mr. Joshua Harris, and the meeting addressed the developments in the political situation in the country, the ongoing dialogues to elect the President of the Republic, and the formation of a government capable of facing the challenges, enjoying national support, strengthening Iraq’s partnership with the United States, and being open to the Arab and regional environment, in a way that serves the Iraqi people and their aspirations.”
The coordinating framework is considering withdrawing al-Maliki's nomination under pressure from Washington.
An Iraqi parliamentary source stated that the coordination framework is studying options for dealing with Washington's rejection of Nouri al-Maliki's nomination, including the possibility of his withdrawal .
The US-based Al-Hurra channel, in a report followed by Al-Sa’a network, quoted the parliamentary source as saying that “there are two scenarios being discussed within the coalition: the first is to proceed with nominating Maliki and leave the final decision to the parliamentary blocs, and the second is for Maliki to withdraw in exchange for being given the opportunity to name an alternative figure .”
He added that "the framework has until Sunday, which is the likely date for holding a parliamentary session to elect a new president of the republic, who in turn will task the candidate of the largest bloc, which is the coordinating framework, with forming the government ."
He noted that "the framework formed a committee to negotiate with influential parties on the American side, while emphasizing the need to reduce escalation and control media statements until the results of those contacts become clear
The citizen bears the consequences of the caretaker government's austerity decisions.
The caretaker government sparked widespread public anger in its final days after issuing a series of sudden austerity measures to address a financial crisis it had long denied existed, particularly in the lead-up to the last parliamentary elections.
These measures included imposing additional fees, levies, and taxes that disrupted local markets and contributed to a commercial recession affecting most economic activities.
Observers accused the government of lacking transparency and credibility in its dealings with the public regarding the true state of the country's finances. Prior to the elections, the government had repeatedly asserted that Iraq possessed sufficient liquidity and a cash surplus to cover public expenditures, including salaries and payments to companies and contractors.
The incoming government is required to reconsider the Sudanese government's decisions regarding taxes and fees, especially those affecting the salaries of employees, retirees, and social protection beneficiaries.
However, the government's rhetoric shifted after the elections, as it resorted to raising taxes on imported goods and reducing government subsidies for service sectors. It also threatened to cut employee salaries, allowances, bonuses, and travel expenses, justifying these measures with a budget deficit exceeding 40 trillion Iraqi dinars.
In this context, political analyst Abu Talib al-Zaydi criticized the government's tendency to shift the blame for its economic mismanagement onto the citizens.
Observers accused the government of lacking transparency and credibility in dealing with public opinion regarding the true state of the country's finances.
Al-Zaydi told Al-Da’i News Agency that taxes and revenue maximization are natural tools for supporting national economies when managed according to a clear vision and used to improve services and expand social safety nets. He explained that what is happening in Iraq does not reflect sound economic logic, given the imposition of financial burdens without any real service in return. This has damaged the market structure, raised prices, and exacerbated poverty and unemployment rates.
He added that the next government is required to reconsider the decisions of the Al-Sudani government regarding taxes and fees, especially those affecting the salaries of employees, retirees, and social welfare beneficiaries. He questioned the timing of these measures, coming as the government's term nears its end and coinciding with constitutional obligations.
Al-Zaydi pointed out that the conflicting government statements before and after the elections regarding the financial situation reveal a premeditated intention to pass the crisis on to the next government, with the aim of covering up corruption, mismanagement, and significant financial waste.
The austerity measures did not include the salaries of ministers and those in special grades, who still receive high salaries, while the burden of the financial crisis was placed on low-income groups.
On the other hand, economist Abdul Salam Hassan affirmed that imposing taxes and fees is subject to established legal frameworks and cannot be amended or introduced except through new legislation passed by the House of Representatives.
In a statement to *Al-Da'i News*, he explained that economic experts had predicted a financial crisis since the formation of the current government, resulting from weak planning and mismanagement. He noted that the warnings issued by specialists went unheeded, leading the country to a critical financial juncture.
Hassan indicated that the government is currently striving to secure salaries for employees and retirees, but indicators suggest that financial pressures will worsen in the coming period. This has prompted the government to reduce or eliminate some job allowances and lift some subsidies for the education, health, and food ration sectors.
The fundamental problem lies in the imbalance between oil revenues and government expenditures, the majority of which go to salaries. This creates a persistent deficit that can only be addressed through comprehensive reform plans, prepared by specialized bodies, aimed at reducing spending and achieving fiscal balance.
He pointed out that the austerity measures did not include the salaries of ministers and those holding special-grade positions, who continue to receive high salaries, while the burden of the financial crisis has fallen on low-income groups.
Experts believe the core problem lies in the imbalance between oil revenues and government expenditures, the majority of which go to salaries. This creates a persistent deficit that can only be addressed through comprehensive reform plans, prepared by specialized bodies, aimed at reducing spending and achieving fiscal balance.
The question remains regarding the role of the hundreds of advisors and experts working in state institutions and their actual contributions to managing the economic portfolio. Furthermore, the fate of non-oil revenues, particularly those generated from border and seaports, investment companies, and fees for public services, remains a concern. These represent significant financial resources that have not been clearly included in the general budgets, raising serious questions about their management mechanisms and ultimate fate.
Dropsite website: Trump may order an attack against Iran early Sunday morning
Sources reported on Friday (January 30, 2026) that Washington informed an allied country in the region that US President Donald Trump might authorize an attack against Iran as early as Sunday morning.
DropSite, citing its sources and followed up by Baghdad Today, reported that “Washington informed an allied country in the region that Trump may authorize an attack against Iran as early as Sunday morning.”
Meanwhile, a State Department spokesman told Fox News that "Trump wants Iran to come to the negotiating table and make an agreement that addresses the obvious concerns."
Ali Shamkhani, advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, said that “any move that indicates hostile intent on the part of the enemy will be met with a proportionate, effective and deterrent response, stressing that they do not limit the geography of the confrontation to the sea only, and have prepared themselves for broader and more advanced scenarios.”
Shamkhani added that they "uncovered the enemy's operational plan and have full oversight of it, and strikes will be directed at the appropriate time to points that 'strangle' the plan."
Papers from recent economic history: How did the first stock exchange in Baghdad originate?
Some may not know that Iraq is considered one of the leading Arab countries in establishing a stock exchange, as it established a stock exchange for trade, also known as a commodities exchange, in the fourth decade of the last century. The stock exchange was first opened in the city of Baghdad following the issuance of Stock Exchange Law No. 65 of 1936, which was considered one of the economic activities undertaken by the Prime Minister at the time, Yassin al-Hashemi.
Initially, the well-known Egyptian economist Talaat Harb was summoned to discuss the possibility of establishing a commodities exchange and to study the establishment of an industrial/agricultural bank.
This resulted in the government adopting a proposal to establish a stock exchange, leading to the issuance of the aforementioned law. The Ministry of Finance collaborated with the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce to determine the procedures for trading, the method of broker registration, and to establish a list of the main commodities traded on the exchange, including the minimum trading volume and other details. The list of commodities included most types of grains, some types of seeds, as well as wool, hides, and dates.
Saturday, July 11, 1936, witnessed the official opening of the stock exchange, which occupied two rented rooms as its headquarters.
The stock exchange was open from 8 am to 12 pm in the summer, and from 9 am to 12 pm in the winter, as well as from 2 pm to 3 pm as well, while Sunday was the official holiday of the stock exchange.
The stock exchange management committee included a group of traders and producers, namely Kamel Al-Khudairi, Abdul-Moneim Al-Khudairi, Abdul-Hadi Al-Jalabi, Ails An-Frank Streeck, Murad Jouri, Nouri Fattah, Austin Eastwood, Kamel Al-Jaderji, and Daoud Al-Bahrani.
It is worth mentioning that the stock exchange's staff consisted of only five employees, as the well-known economist Mir Sabri was the first to assume the position of agent to supervise the stock exchange, then Mr. George Latif became supervisor in 1937, Mr. Fouad George became accountant, Mr. Boutros Faraj Al-Hindi became a clerk for the stock exchange, and two servants.
The stock exchange’s expenses amounted to 930 dinars in 1937, while its revenues were 280 dinars, and the Ministry of Finance provided it with an annual subsidy to cover the deficit amounting to 650 dinars.
The stock exchange faced numerous difficulties. Some sources indicate that Jewish merchants, who dominated commercial activity at the time, played a significant role in creating these difficulties. Consequently, most buying and selling transactions took place outside the exchange. The Ministry of Finance concluded that the stock exchange had failed to achieve its intended purpose as the central hub for regulating trade in commercial goods. Therefore, the decision was made to suspend its operations, pursuant to Law No. 54 of 1938, which suspended the stock exchange.
Following this, a number of measures were taken to liquidate the stock exchange’s operations after auditing its accounts, and all its furniture, records, and files were subsequently transferred to the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce.
I had the opportunity to see those dusty files in the mid-nineties of the last century in the library of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce when I was preparing my master’s thesis. This came about as a result of a meeting with the then Director General of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Munir Saeed.
I tried my best to look at what those files contained in terms of correspondence and other things, but due to the passage of time and poor storage, it has become difficult, if not impossible, to read what was written.
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