An economist warns of the decline of the Iraqi dinar due to currency printing policies.
Economic expert Nabil Al-Ali called on the Central Bank of Iraq on Sunday to develop an urgent plan to contain the repercussions of monetary inflation, warning of a significant decline in the Iraqi dinar's exchange rate as a result of current monetary policies.
The video for this My FX Buddies Blog is below here:
Al-Ali told the Information Agency that "the government is currently relying on printing money to secure salaries and expenditures under the guise of the borrowing law," explaining that "the continuation of this mechanism will put the Central Bank in a difficult position and may force it to deplete its reserves to cover the shortfall."
Al-Ali stressed the necessity for "the Central Bank to withdraw the printed currency from circulation as soon as it is no longer needed, and to destroy or store it instead of recycling it."
He indicated that "this measure is the only way to maintain exchange rate stability and prevent monetary inflation that threatens the purchasing power of citizens."
Al-Saadi: The connection to the US Federal Reserve reflects a flaw in financial management.
Economic expert Rashid Al-Saadi confirmed today, Sunday, that the connection with the US Federal Reserve reflects a flaw in the management of money and requires reform, not a break.
Al-Saadi told Al-Maalouma News Agency that “Iraq’s continued involvement with the US Federal Reserve reveals a clear weakness in the management of funds and financial authority,” noting that “this file has not been managed professionally throughout the past years.”
He explained that “the heavy reliance on the US Federal Reserve reflects a flaw in the management of financial policy and a weakness in the institutions concerned with this aspect, which has made Iraq restricted by external procedures that control part of its funds.”
He added that "a sudden disengagement at the present time is not possible because that could lead to serious repercussions and economic disasters, especially since Iraqi funds are protected under the American decree, in addition to the existence of numerous international lawsuits related to the stage of Iraq's entry into Kuwait, which may be activated and lead to the freezing of funds."
He explained that "what raises questions is the US government's interference in the mechanisms for protecting these funds, even though Iraq has the ability to manage its resources if the will and proper management are available."
It should be noted that this matter requires serious follow-up and gradual correction of errors, and that improving management is the most important step at present to avoid any future crises.
Investment Authority: The dinar will be the sole currency for the sale of residential units.
The National Investment Commission affirmed the commitment of investment authorities in all governorates to implementing the applicable regulations and controls regarding the sale and lease of residential units within investment projects. These regulations stipulate the exclusive use of the Iraqi dinar in all sales and installment transactions, emphasizing the prohibition of dealing in any foreign currency. Hanan Jassim, spokesperson for the National Investment Commission, stated to Al-Sabah newspaper that this affirmation comes as part of its ongoing monitoring to ensure adherence to the approved regulations and enhance compliance levels, particularly in light of current economic changes and the fluctuations in the exchange market resulting from regional and international tensions. This aims to reduce informal foreign currency transactions and support the stability of the local market.
The commission clarified that this measure is based on applicable regulations and instructions, particularly Article (10), which stipulates the exclusive use of the Iraqi dinar for payments on housing units and their installments. It noted that observations and complaints had been received indicating that some entities were requiring transactions in foreign currencies, contrary to instructions. This constitutes a clear violation of official regulations and negatively impacts market stability and the protection of citizens' rights. The commission stressed the necessity for investment companies implementing housing projects to refrain from demanding payment in any currency other than the Iraqi dinar, whether in sales or installment transactions. It affirmed that violating entities will be held legally accountable under the relevant laws.
She added that these measures come within the framework of supporting the state’s monetary policy and enhancing confidence in the national currency, as well as reducing fluctuations in the exchange market, especially in light of the unstable global economic conditions, which will positively impact consumer protection and ensure an organized and fair investment environment.
Jassim called on citizens to report any violations in this regard, stressing that she will continue to follow up on the implementation of instructions in coordination with the competent regulatory authorities, and take the necessary legal measures against violators, in order to consolidate the principle of the rule of law and enhance stability in the investment housing sector.
79 banks in Iraq… Is the Central Bank responsible for the sector's inflation and weak oversight?
The Independent – Debate is growing in economic circles regarding the state of the banking sector in Iraq, given the presence of approximately 79 operating banks, including government, private, and foreign institutions. This number is considered high relative to the size of the national economy and the actual level of financial inclusion. Despite this large number, real activity is practically concentrated in a limited number of banks, while other institutions suffer from a weak customer base, limited lending, or recurring losses that raise serious questions.
The Iraqi banking sector, as evidenced by indicators circulating in recent years, suffers not so much from a shortage of institutions as from a crisis in its business model. State-owned banks hold the lion's share of deposits, particularly those related to public sector salaries and government accounts, while a large segment of private banks rely more on money transfer services and foreign currency sales than on development lending or financing productive projects. This structural imbalance has resulted in a banking market that appears saturated in number but has limited economic impact.
In this context, the Independent Press Agency directed a series of questions to the Central Bank of Iraq concerning the mechanisms for the annual evaluation of bank performance, the criteria used to calculate profits and losses, and the accuracy of these indicators in reflecting the true activity of some institutions. Previous financial data indicates that a number of banks are recording recurring losses or limited profits that are inconsistent with their declared capital, raising questions about asset quality, compliance levels, and management's ability to achieve sustainable returns.
A fundamental question also arises regarding banks suffering from a weak customer base or limited geographic reach and digital services, at a time when the world is witnessing a rapid shift towards electronic banking and financial technology. Weak trust in banks, and the reliance of a large percentage of the money supply on transactions outside the banking system, reflect a deeper crisis related to the culture of saving, the effectiveness of services, and past experiences that have eroded public confidence in the sector.
The challenges are not limited to the internal performance of banks, but extend to the regulatory environment and international pressures. Recent years have witnessed a tightening of compliance and oversight standards, particularly concerning international transfers and anti-money laundering, leading to the exclusion or restriction of some banks' international transactions. This reality has placed the sector before a dual test: complying with global standards on the one hand, and maintaining the continuity of domestic operations on the other.
Given these circumstances, questions are mounting about whether the current number of banks is commensurate with the size of the Iraqi economy, or whether the market needs a regulatory overhaul to restructure the banking landscape. Options such as mergers, restructuring, or even orderly closures remain theoretically on the table, but any such move requires a delicate balance between bolstering financial stability and preventing shocks to confidence or liquidity.
Questions are also raised about the central bank’s vision for the coming years: Is the sector moving towards a gradual reform that addresses weaknesses from within, or may economic and regulatory pressures impose a broader restructuring of the banking system? Are there official studies that assess the actual market needs and define the minimum standards that ensure the bank remains able to operate effectively?
The current reality reveals a clear paradox: a banking sector large in number but limited in its developmental role; significant cash liquidity outside the banking system, contrasted with a pressing need to finance investment and production; and numerous banks, yet public trust in them remains below the required level. Caught between these equations, the central bank faces the complex task of balancing stability and reform, and ensuring that the banking sector becomes a genuine engine of the economy, not merely an intermediary in the flow of dollars and remittances.
The Independent Press Agency confirms that it is awaiting the response of the Central Bank of Iraq to the questions directed regarding the evaluation mechanisms, the future of the troubled banks, and the possible restructuring plans, and will publish any official clarifications within a professional framework that ensures transparency and the right of reply for all concerned parties.
Want to Support My FX Buddies?
.png)
ThanksSupport My FX Buddies Big or Small I appreciate it all
BuyMeACoffee CashApp:$tishwash
https://paypal.me/tishwash
.jpeg)
Iranian media: No negotiations will take place as long as the "naval blockade" remains in place.
Iran’s Tasnim news agency reported on Sunday that Tehran has not yet decided whether to send a negotiating team, stressing that no negotiations with the United States will take place as long as US President Donald Trump’s declaration regarding the “naval blockade” of Iran remains in effect.
The agency, which is close to the Revolutionary Guard, said that the exchange of messages between Iran and the United States continued during the past few days through the Pakistani mediator, following the end of the first round of negotiations.
She added that the exchange of messages was a continuation of the same path that took place during the first round, which, according to the agency, ended in failure due to what she described as "excessive American ambitions".
She noted that the Pakistani mediator resumed exchanging messages after that round ended.
Earlier today, US President Donald Trump confirmed that his Vice President, JD Vance, would not be traveling to Pakistan to negotiate with Iran, citing "security reasons".
In contrast, Pakistani officials reported tightening security measures in the capital, Islamabad, in preparation for hosting possible talks between Washington and Tehran in the coming days.
The Wall Street Journal also reported that the Trump administration expects a "breakthrough" in the ongoing negotiations with Iran in the next few days, amid American anticipation of Iranian steps in exchange for easing sanctions and military threats.
With a "limited" agenda, the framework sets Monday as the date for deciding on the candidate for Prime Minister.
On Sunday, the General Secretariat of the Coordination Framework called on the framework’s forces to hold a meeting on Monday at the office of the leader of the Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hakim, stressing that the agenda is limited to (deciding on the candidate for the presidency of the Council of Ministers).
The coordinating framework that includes the ruling Shiite political forces in Iraq failed to hold a "crucial" meeting yesterday, Saturday, and it was postponed until tomorrow, Monday.
These developments come at a time when the government formation process has entered a critical phase, following the election of Nizar Amidi as President of the Republic. This places the largest bloc before a constitutional deadline ending on April 26 to officially present its candidate, amid fears of returning to square one of political deadlock.
The "framework" fails three times... Was the neighbor called in to break the tie between Maliki and Sudanese?
$100 million to recycle faces rejected by America!
In a surprising political shift, Baghdad appeared to be moving beyond its traditional boundaries, resembling—according to analysts—an “alternative Islamabad” through which conflicting messages are exchanged between Washington and Tehran.
In this context, analysts argue that Iran, even at the height of regional escalation, does not treat Iraq as a file that can be withdrawn or retreated from, but rather as an ongoing sphere of influence extending from security to politics, and from factions to the process of government formation.
These analysts maintain that even if Tehran loses some rounds of the conflict, it remains a powerful force in the Iraqi decision-making equation, especially during government formation.
Qaani in Baghdad: A Sign at a Sensitive Time
. In a notable development, information leaked Saturday evening from multiple sources about the arrival of the commander of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Ismail Qaani, in Baghdad, in a visit described as unusual in its timing and context.
According to political analysts, this visit gains significance as it is the first since the recent military confrontations in the region, and it comes at a sensitive political juncture in Iraq, marked by repeated setbacks within the "coordination framework" regarding the selection of the next prime minister.
Independent politician and former MP Mithal al-Alousi interprets Ismail Qaani's visit to Baghdad as more than just a fleeting diplomatic or security move; rather, it is a multifaceted political message that intersects at a crucial juncture in the Iraqi political process.
In an interview with Al-Mada, al-Alousi stated that the timing of the visit, "at a delicate moment of negotiation between Iran and the United States, carries a clear political implication: that Iraq is not part of arrangements being managed in other arenas, whether in Pakistan or elsewhere, and that the Revolutionary Guard is reaffirming its commitment to its role within Iraq, given its strategic importance to Iran."
Al-Alousi adds that, from Tehran's perspective, Qaani does not need direct meetings with the leaders of the "Coordination Framework," explaining that "communication channels between Tehran and its allies in Baghdad operate continuously and around the clock, ensuring everyone is directly informed of the details. Therefore, the visit is not for managing communication, but rather to solidify its presence and convey the message that Iran is at the heart of the scene."
He believes the message is not limited to the Iraqi domestic scene, but extends to Iran's regional and international adversaries, stating that the visit "also carries a signal to Israel and the United States, indicating that the forces allied with Tehran in Baghdad still possess tools of influence, including drones and missiles, making them a bargaining chip in any negotiation or escalation."
Ismail Qaani has led the Quds Force, the external arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), since 2020, succeeding Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport earlier that year.
Since assuming his position, Qaani has made frequent visits to Iraq, but announcements of his movements remain limited and infrequent.
Re-engineering the system
: Al-Alousi believes that what Tehran envisions as reshaping the political system in Iraq is linked to an attempt to ensure the continued flow of influence through what he calls the “minimum mobilization” of factions, which allows Iran’s regional movement between Baghdad, Tehran, Beirut and other arenas to remain in constant contact.
According to Al-Alousi, this approach relies on using local networks within Iraq as intermediaries in complex matters related to money, influence, and regional security, thus placing Iraq at the heart of a broader web of calculations.
In a related context, Al-Alousi points to movements within some Sunni political circles that have discussed investments and the allocation of funds estimated at over $100 million, aimed at supporting figures with controversial affiliations, in an attempt to reshape the balance of power within the next government.
He says that this course of action, if true, reflects an attempt to create a government based on "mutual political dominance" between internal and regional forces, supported by unannounced understandings between various parties.
Washington's position: Rejection of armed factions.
Conversely, Al-Alousi doubts that Washington will accept these political formulations, whether through Qaani or anyone else, indicating that the American position is geared towards readjusting the rules of the game in Iraq, not reproducing them.
He affirms that the United States “will not accept the presence of armed factions within the governing equation,” and that the next phase may witness more decisive moves to hold accountable the networks of corruption and abuses associated with the administration of the state in
recent years.
This comes as the “coordination framework” failed three times in one week to hold a decisive meeting to choose the next prime minister, amidst a clear division between American pressure pushing for the “dismantling of the factions,” and Iranian pressure that became evident with the arrival of Qassem Soleimani.
According to political circles, the complexities of the situation reveal a convergence of external pressures, one aspect of which revolves around the American rejection of any governmental formula that does not include clear steps toward “dismantling the militias,” versus
escalating Iranian pressure that manifested practically with the arrival of the Quds Force commander in Baghdad.
In the midst of this clash, fingers are being pointed, simultaneously, at the teams of Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, as the two main poles of competition, with indications that both sought to summon Soleimani in an attempt to resolve the deadlock or tip the scales in favor of one side over the other within the Shia political establishment.
Political circles had previously circulated accounts suggesting that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had recommended that Maliki be given the premiership. From a broader analytical perspective, Australian-based political researcher Ahmed al-Yassiri offers a sharp reading of the nature of Iranian influence in Iraq, asserting that the issue is “far beyond traditional political or security influence.” Al-Yassiri tells Al-
Mada that
“ Iran has built a complex and intertwined network of influence within Iraq, distributed between security, which is managed by factions, and politics, which is led by parties, in addition to extensive cultural influence through seminaries, religious institutions, and Shiite community organizations.” He adds that “this network does not operate in isolation, but rather in an interconnected manner; where security influence protects political influence, political influence secures economic influence, while economic influence fuels the cultural dimension.” He warns that this influence “cannot be easily eradicated, and may even persist even if the regime in Tehran changes,” explaining that “the forces associated with it within Iraq will remain active because the structure that has been established is deeper than just a transient political power.”
In assessing the repercussions of the recent war, Al-Yassiri believes that “Tehran’s insistence on including issues like Lebanon in any regional negotiations reflects its confidence in its ability to protect its influence in various arenas, whether it is in a position of strength or under
pressure.” He adds that “Iran, even while suffering heavy blows, does not abandon its strategies, but rather rearranges them.”
Regarding Iraq specifically, Al-Yassiri asserts that “Tehran will not relinquish its influence under any circumstances, because this influence is built on a deep internal network, not on a political decision that can be reversed.”
Al-Yassiri, who heads the Arab-Australian Center for Strategic Studies, believes that “this reality was also evident in the election results, where the forces of the Coordination Framework achieved a clear victory, benefiting from various tools, including media influence and the ability to manage public opinion.” He adds that “the public was reassured through the issues of services and salaries, at a time when the factions rebranded themselves as a force for protection, not a force for conflict.”
Al-Yassiri concludes with a decisive diagnosis: “Iranian influence in Iraq is not merely the influence of a foreign state, but rather an integrated internal system. Therefore, reducing it – if it happens – will not be by an external decision, but by a profound internal change in the Iraqi public mood and a reshaping of societal consciousness, as partially occurred in the October protests.”
The Sudanese have an overwhelming majority in the
Iraqi parliament and on the Iraqi street.
In a political scene characterized by complexity and ongoing tensions, the name of the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, stands out as the most prominent and influential figure in the Iraqi political equation, not only within the parliament but also on the street, which now views his experience as a model of relative stability and executive management capable of dealing with accumulated challenges.
Despite this political and popular weight, a fundamental question strongly presents itself: Why doesn’t the coordinating framework move towards resolving the issue of the premiership by adopting the Sudanese option, in line with the indicators of parliamentary support and popular acceptance, and end the state of political deadlock that has exhausted the country?
The continued postponement and procrastination in making a decision not only reflects a state of hesitation, but may also be interpreted as a disregard for the will of a broad segment of voters, who have expressed, directly or indirectly, their support for stability and continuity, which is what the Sudanese represent at this sensitive stage.
In this context, the importance of adhering to the democratic principle of respecting election results becomes clear, especially given the official statements by some Shiite political forces asserting that the largest parliamentary bloc has the right to nominate the prime minister. This is a constitutional and political principle that should govern any subsequent agreements and should not be subject to interpretation or obstruction.
Granting the right of “veto” to small blocs or using tools of political obstruction to impose conditions that are inconsistent with the real balance of power represents a dangerous precedent that strikes at the heart of the democratic process, turning it from a representative system into an arena of power struggles that does not accurately reflect the popular will.
The Coordination Committee, as a key player in the political landscape, faces a true test regarding its commitment to prioritizing the national interest over narrow factional or partisan considerations. Supporting a widely accepted candidate could be a pivotal step in restoring public confidence in the political process and pave the way for a new era of political and executive stability.
Resolving this issue is not just about naming a prime minister, but about sending a clear message that political forces are capable of respecting the rules of the democratic game, and that they are ready to side with the will of the people, not with the logic of obstruction and polarization.
Ultimately, the question remains open: Will the coordinating framework respond to this challenge and translate its slogans into actions, or will political deadlock remain the most prominent feature of the Iraqi scene in the next stage?
Sources: Maliki re-nominates himself after US veto of Badri and attempts to obstruct Sudani's appointment
Well-informed political sources reported that Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, received clear indications of American rejection of passing his candidate, the current head of the Accountability and Justice Commission, Bassem al-Badri, which made the chances of passing him “completely nonexistent,” according to the sources.
The sources added that this fact prompted Maliki to re-nominate himself for the premiership, in a move described as an attempt at political blackmail and buying time, rather than a serious candidacy to compete.
She explained that Maliki is well aware that he does not have any real chance of reaching the position at the present stage, as well as the impossibility of passing his candidate, but his move comes within the context of disrupting the ongoing agreements within the coordination framework.
The sources indicated that this move is part of a desperate attempt to obstruct the passage of the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, for a new term, especially in light of his significantly rising chances and his approach to obtaining the official mandate to form the next government.
Trump: JD Vance will not be traveling to Pakistan tomorrow for security reasons.
US President Donald Trump confirmed on Sunday that his Vice President, JD Vance, will not travel to Pakistan to negotiate with Iran, citing "security reasons".
Trump told ABC News that JD Vance "will not lead" the U.S. delegation to Pakistan to negotiate with Iran "for security reasons," he said.
He noted that the Secret Service was unable to prepare for the trip in such a short time, with only 24 hours to spare, adding: "He's not going just because of security, JD is great."
President Trump just told me Vance will not be going to Islamabad. He said the issue is security — the Secret Service couldn’t do it on 24 hours notice. “It’s only because of security,” he told me. “JD’s great.”
The US representative to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, had told the same network that "Vance will lead the Washington delegation in the Islamabad negotiations on Monday."
Earlier today, Pakistani officials reported that authorities had tightened security measures in the capital, Islamabad, in preparation for hosting possible talks between the United States and Iran in the coming days.
The Wall Street Journal reported that President Donald Trump's administration expects a "breakthrough" in the ongoing negotiations with Iran within the next few days.
The newspaper quoted sources as saying that Washington is awaiting detailed Iranian steps in exchange for easing the pressure of sanctions and military threats, as they put it.
Trump: We hope Iran will accept our offer or we will destroy all power plants and bridges (Update)
Trump said in brief remarks to ABC News: “The agreement with Iran will happen one way or another, in a friendly way or a hard way.”
He added: Iran has committed a serious violation of the ceasefire, but we believe we are capable of reaching an agreement.
He added: We are making a fair and acceptable offer to Iran and we hope that they will accept it. If they do not, we will destroy all power stations and bridges.
He continued: Our representatives will head to Islamabad tomorrow evening for negotiations, explaining: It is time to end the Iranian killing machine.
He continued: Iran decided to open fire yesterday in the Strait of Hormuz in flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement, and it is losing $500 million a day from closing the strait, while we are not losing anything.
Trump's remarks come after the military spokesman for Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters announced yesterday the re-closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as was the case during the 40-day military conflict in the region.
The spokesman stressed that the strait would remain under the control of the armed forces and under strict surveillance, noting that the continuation of this situation depended on the United States not committing to guaranteeing the freedom of movement of ships to and from Iran.
Iran reactivates all its missile bases and drone launch sites
Iran's Tasnim News Agency reported that Iran used the ceasefire period as a "golden opportunity" to fully reopen and equip all of its missile bases and drone platforms.
The agency stated on Sunday evening, April 19, 2026, in its report No. (304) issued by its "Interpretation of War Group" on the fifty-first day of the conflict, that this step comes within the framework of enhancing military readiness. The report indicated that in the event of a resumption of military confrontations, estimates suggest the possibility of launching hundreds of ballistic missiles within the first hours of the commencement of operations.
