US outlines 7 demands for Iraq's next PM in diplomatic letter
The United States delivered a pointed diplomatic message to Iraqi leaders, outlining seven specific demands for the selection and performance of the country's next prime minister.
The letter, reported by Al-Monitor on Thursday, places heavy emphasis on reducing Iranian influence in Baghdad's political and security affairs amid ongoing US-Iran tensions and Iraq's prolonged government formation process following the November 2025 elections.
The seven demands
According to sources familiar with the correspondence, the US letter specifies the following conditions for the incoming prime minister and the government they lead:
- Elect a prime minister who prioritizes Iraqi national interests above external alignments, particularly those tied to Tehran.
- Institutionalize and bring the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) — a coalition of mostly Shia militias, many backed by Iran — fully under state control, limiting their independent operations.
- Reduce corruption and combat money laundering, with a focus on disrupting illicit financial networks that benefit Iranian-aligned groups.
- Limit or exclude Iranian-backed militias from key positions in the new cabinet and security apparatus.
- Strengthen Iraq's sovereignty by curbing foreign interference, especially from Iran, in domestic governance and decision-making.
- Enhance cooperation with the United States on security, counterterrorism, and economic matters as a partner rather than a conduit for regional rivals.
- Implement reforms to promote inclusive governance, economic diversification away from oil dependency, and accountability to prevent sectarian divisions.
The demands reflect the Trump administration's broader strategy to weaken Iran's regional proxy network, particularly in Iraq, where Tehran has long exerted influence through political parties, militias, and economic ties.
Context amid government formation deadlock
Iraq remains without a new government more than three months after parliamentary elections, with the Shia Coordination Framework — the largest bloc — initially nominating former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in late January 2026. Maliki, who served from 2006 to 2011, is widely viewed in Washington as closely aligned with Iran and responsible for sectarian policies that fueled instability and the rise of ISIS.
President Donald Trump publicly rejected Maliki's candidacy on Truth Social in late January, warning that the US would "no longer help Iraq" if he returned to power. Subsequent reports indicated threats of severe measures, including restrictions on Iraq's access to oil revenues held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York — a lifeline accounting for roughly 90% of the federal budget.
The US letter, delivered amid these pressures, appears to formalize Washington's red lines. It builds on earlier warnings, including potential sanctions against Iraq's Central Bank, Oil Ministry, and officials linked to Iranian-backed groups if Maliki's nomination persists.
Some Framework factions have since signaled willingness to reconsider Maliki, with reports suggesting a possible extension of caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani's term or selection of a compromise figure acceptable to both domestic stakeholders and Washington.
Broader geopolitical stakes
The demands arrive as US-Iran indirect negotiations continue, with Washington pushing Tehran to curb its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and support for proxies — including Iraqi militias. Iraq sits at the heart of this rivalry: US forces maintain a presence for counter-ISIS operations, while Iranian-aligned groups have targeted American interests in the past.
By conditioning future cooperation — and implicitly threatening economic leverage — on compliance, the US seeks to reshape Iraq's political landscape.
Analysts note that success could enhance Iraqi sovereignty and stability, but failure risks deepening divisions or triggering financial crisis.
Al Jazeera quoted a leader in the coordination framework as saying: "We cancelled our meeting yesterday because it was pointless due to Maliki's insistence on running for prime minister."
Al Jazeera quoted a leader in the Coordination Framework as saying that the Framework’s forces cancelled their meeting scheduled for yesterday “because it was pointless,” noting Nouri al-Maliki’s insistence on running for the premiership.
The leader added, according to the channel, that “everyone is convinced that al-Maliki’s nomination will not pass,” in light of what he described as “the seriousness of the American sanctions,” considering that these factors make the chances of agreeing on his nomination limited at the present stage.
In the same context, informed political sources reported that the leaders of the “Coordination Framework” failed to hold the last two meetings to which they were invited during the past two days, amid al-Maliki’s refusal to participate, due to a trend within the framework to discuss withdrawing his nomination and proposing alternatives, after repeated American messages confirming the rejection of his taking over the next government, while threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq if his nomination is insisted upon.
For his part, a member of the Coordination Framework, who preferred to remain anonymous, stated that internal divisions have effectively disrupted regular meetings and led to the cancellation of several crucial gatherings, amidst the ongoing political deadlock and constitutional vacuum. He explained that the Framework is going through a critical phase due to conflicting positions regarding the premiership, particularly after influential figures within it withdrew their support for al-Maliki's candidacy.
The MP indicated that the majority of the political forces within the framework now believe that insisting on this nomination could deepen the political crisis, prolong the government vacuum, and expose the country to increasing internal and external challenges. Conversely, he affirmed that Maliki remains committed to his nomination and rejects any alternative proposals, asserting that the American position should not be a decisive factor in determining the choices of Iraqi political forces.
He explained that this insistence was met with widespread reservations and objections within the framework, prompting some leaders to boycott recent meetings, which revealed the depth of the disagreement and lack of trust among its members. He concluded by warning that the continuation of the crisis without mutual concessions or agreement on an alternative candidate could threaten the cohesion of the framework and keep the political scene in limbo, with the constitutional vacuum persisting and the formation of a government delayed.
Expert: Only 14% of salaries will be covered
Iraq has no alternatives if Hormuz is closed... we have no option but "divine solutions".
Economic expert Nabil Al-Marsoumi warned on Friday of catastrophic repercussions for the Iraqi economy if Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, stressing that Iraq would practically lose its ability to export its oil through its southern ports, which would reduce its exports from about 3.4 million barrels per day to about 210,000 barrels only, with 200,000 barrels through the Turkish port of Ceyhan and 10,000 barrels per day to Jordan by tankers.
Al-Marsoumi explained that a potential rise in oil prices to $150 per barrel would not compensate for the loss, as monthly revenues would decline from about $7 billion to less than $1 billion, an amount that covers only 14% of salaries. He pointed out that Iraq, unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, does not currently have alternative outlets ready for exporting oil, making it the most vulnerable to any potential closure of the Strait.
Al-Marsoumi asked in a post followed by 964 Network , “What would happen to Iraq if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz?” He pointed out that “if Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq will be prevented from exporting its oil south by sea, and Iraq’s oil exports will decrease from 3.4 million barrels per day to 210,000 barrels per day, of which 200,000 barrels will be from the Turkish port of Ceyhan and 10,000 barrels per day to Jordan via tankers.”
He added that “even if the closure of the strait leads to oil prices rising to $150 a barrel, Iraqi oil revenues will decrease from about $7 billion a month to less than $1 billion, which is only enough to cover 14% of salaries. All of this will happen because Iraq, unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran, does not currently have alternative routes ready for exporting oil.”
He concluded by saying: “Therefore, we have no solutions other than those from heaven that might prevent war or prevent the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.”
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The US chargé d'affaires informed us of sanctions... Muthanna al-Samarrai announces his withdrawal of support for Maliki
The head of the Al-Azm Alliance, Muthanna Al-Samarrai, confirmed that he does not exclusively support the nomination of Nouri Al-Maliki, stressing that his support is focused on the candidate of the Coordination Framework for the premiership, while denying at the same time his withdrawal from the National Political Council known as the “Sunni Framework”.
Al-Samarrai told Iraq Observer that the election of the governor of Salah al-Din took place in a very short period of time, not exceeding three minutes. He revealed that there are expected legal actions and procedures by members of the provincial council and representatives in protest against the voting mechanism, stressing that his coalition will closely follow the developments of the case.
Al-Samarrai addressed a message to the political forces within the Shia bloc, urging them to respect the will of Salah al-Din's representatives and not impose a governor from outside their consensus. He explained that the governor's selection was the result of an agreement between Shia blocs and some Sunni parties. He added that the Azm Alliance currently holds six seats on the provincial council, with the possibility of this number rising to nine, "at which point changing the governor would be a viable option."
On the federal level, Al-Samarrai denied any negotiations with him regarding government positions in exchange for his withdrawal from the nomination for the presidency of the House of Representatives, explaining that his coalition’s objection to voting for the positions of Chief of Staff of the Army and Mayor of Baghdad was not an objection to the individuals, but rather due to the coalition not obtaining its due share in the leadership of the bodies.
He pointed out that the caretaker government does not have the constitutional authority to send names to parliament for the purpose of confirming them in their positions, considering that this contradicts the decisions of the Federal Court.
Regarding the National Political Council, Al-Samarrai confirmed that he did not withdraw from the council, explaining that his absence in the recent period was for personal reasons, and that the internal regulations of the council require consensus in making decisions, noting that the council represents the Sunni component and is not linked to a particular person or entity.
In another context, Al-Samarrai explained that the recent political developments came after a tweet by US President Donald Trump, which he said changed the calculations of a number of political forces, noting that Iraq is part of the international community and cannot be isolated from external interactions.
He added that the acting US ambassador in Baghdad spoke about a possible package of measures towards Iraq, which may include imposing sanctions on individuals or institutions if they do not comply with specific standards, stressing that the American messages that arrived were important and contained details that affect the political scene.
Strategic partnership between the Iraqi and German banking sectors to enhance financial integration
The Association of Iraqi Private Banks announced on Friday a strategic partnership between the Iraqi and German banking sectors to enhance financial integration.
In a statement received by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), the Association said it had renewed its cooperation agreement with the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, a strategic step reflecting both sides' commitment to strengthening professional integration between the banking sectors in Iraq and Germany and supporting institutional development according to best practices and international standards.
The statement added that the agreement was signed by Ahmed Al-Hashemi, Deputy Executive Director of the Association of Iraqi Private Banks, and Econ Döse, Director of the International Consulting Department at the university, confirming both parties' keenness to expand cooperation to include areas with a greater impact on banking performance, governance, and financial innovation. The Association
noted that the renewal of the agreement is a continuation of cooperation in the areas of specialized banking training, consulting, strategy development, institutional capacity building, exchange of technical expertise, support for digital transformation, compliance, and risk management, which will contribute to raising the readiness of Iraqi banks and enhancing their competitiveness.
According to the statement, both sides affirmed that "the next phase will witness a more active role for both parties as an institutional and professional link between the Iraqi and German banking sectors, through the establishment of direct communication channels, the organization of joint dialogue and cooperation platforms, and the facilitation of knowledge and expertise exchange between financial institutions in both countries."
They emphasized that "this partnership will support enhancing the Iraqi banking sector's access to German institutions and markets, and stimulate the interest and investments of German banks and companies in Iraq, by providing a supportive professional environment, enhancing understanding of regulatory frameworks and investment opportunities, and building mutual trust, thus paving the way for launching sustainable financial and economic partnerships."
The statement indicated that "this step is in line with the Central Bank of Iraq's directions for banking reform and enhancing institutional and digital efficiency, which will strengthen the integration of the Iraqi financial sector into the international financial system and open broader horizons for economic integration between Iraq and Germany."
A hazy scene hangs over the corridors of the framework... The decisive hour is stalled by al-Maliki.
Meetings of the comprehensive coordination framework for Shiite forces have been disrupted in recent days, amid a murky situation regarding the fate of the nomination of State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al-Maliki for the next government, and the internal and external rejection that accompanied it.
According to a source within the coordination framework who spoke to Shafaq News Agency, the issue of resolving the nomination controversy remains contingent on the agreement of the two parties to the deadlock within the framework, as Maliki is holding firm to his nomination and has linked its withdrawal to a consensus within the framework.
The lack of agreement among the forces within the coordination framework regarding the withdrawal of al-Maliki's nomination was the reason for the failure to reach a consensus to hold a meeting scheduled for yesterday, Thursday, according to the source, who hinted that the coming hours may witness a resolution to this issue.
After the framework failed to hold an emergency meeting for a week, political circles witnessed meetings between some of the influential forces in the Shiite community to discuss solutions to get out of the crisis.
Some forces within the Coordination Committee have agreed, in principle, to make the decision contingent on the results of the ongoing negotiations with Iran, and a decisive meeting may be held early next week.
The “coordination framework,” which includes ruling Shiite political forces in Iraq, is witnessing a division over the nomination of Maliki for the next government, amid American warnings of the repercussions of his selection. This has prompted forces within the coalition to try to persuade him to withdraw in order to preserve the unity of the framework, while Maliki insists on his nomination and believes that reversing it should be done by an official decision from the coalition.
The escalating American pressure on Iraq comes as a translation of President Donald Trump’s explicit threats, which included criticism of the previous course taken by Maliki when he assumed the premiership for eight years.
Last Wednesday, the US State Department confirmed in an exclusive statement to Shafaq News Agency that Washington's position remains "firm and unwavering" regarding the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki for the Iraqi premiership, warning that his selection would force the United States to reassess its relationship with Iraq.
On Thursday, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry confirmed that it had received "verbal" messages from the United States rejecting Maliki, threatening sanctions targeting Iraqi individuals and institutions, and threatening to reconsider the relationship with Iraq.
"Due to its futility"... the scheduled coordination framework meeting has been cancelled
"Due to its futility"... the scheduled coordination framework meeting has been cancelled
A leader within the Coordination Framework revealed the cancellation of the scheduled meeting.
Al Jazeera quoted the leader as saying, "The Coordination Framework meeting that was scheduled to be held has been canceled."
He added that "the meeting was canceled because it was pointless due to the insistence of Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, on his candidacy for prime minister."
As Iraq continues to witness a rapidly growing youth population and an expanding creative and technology sector, strengthening access to future-ready skills is essential to unlocking new opportunities for young creators and professionals.
This collaboration reflects a shared vision of empowering youth, strengthening the creative and tech ecosystem, and opening new pathways for the next generation of digital creators.
We're looking forward to soon share the initiatives, opportunities, and programs that will emerge from this partnership in the coming weeks.
Stay tuned, this is just the beginning!
Reuters: Washington is considering targeting Iranian leaders
Reuters, citing US officials, revealed on Friday that Washington's military options regarding Iran are not limited to targeting nuclear facilities or military sites, but may include strikes against specific Iranian leaders if a decision is made to attack.
According to Reuters, the plans being discussed within the US administration include escalation scenarios, given the continued tension over the Iranian nuclear program, noting that any potential military operation could be extensive and extend for a considerable period of time.
Officials explained that targeting leading figures is among the options being considered, but it involves complex intelligence and political calculations, given the sensitivity of the regional and international repercussions of such a move.
There was no immediate official comment from the White House or Iran regarding the Reuters report, as diplomatic efforts continue alongside military preparations, amid a tense standoff between Washington and Tehran.
With a stroke of the pen
You hear about corruption but don't know how it goes on? Here are the details of how contracts are manipulated, and the theft and looting are carried out, in "numbers" - Urgent
The average Iraqi hears the word "corruption" almost every day, as it has become a constant backdrop in political speeches, oversight reports, and café conversations. But what he sees firsthand is far simpler than these grand pronouncements: a street that has been repaved multiple times only to crack again with the first rain, a "renovated" school whose roof still leaks, a new hospital but lacking sufficient equipment or a full staff.
In a remote neighborhood, elementary school students leave their classrooms after the first downpour of the season. The road leading to the school is riddled with potholes and stagnant water, and the schoolyard has turned into sticky mud. Just months ago, a local official appeared on television announcing the "completion of a major road and school rehabilitation project in the district." That evening, a parent sits watching the news and hears about the launch of a new service project, "bigger than the previous one," to improve the same situation. His son turns to him and asks, "Why do they fix the street every year only for it to fall apart again?" The father replies bitterly, "The street remains the same, but the contracts get bigger."
This discrepancy between what is declared on paper and what people experience on the ground is the best entry point for understanding corruption, not merely as stealing money in a contract here or a deal there, but as an integrated system that begins from the moment the project is conceived and does not end with impunity.
How is a corrupt deal created from the moment of the idea?
In many cases, the story begins long before the contract is signed, at the moment the "project idea" is presented. An attractive title is used: "development," "rehabilitation," "reconstruction," and a narrative of importance and necessity is woven around it. At this initial stage, the estimated cost is presented inflated above the actual market price, and the technical specifications and conditions are formulated in a seemingly professional manner, but in reality, they narrow the scope of genuine competition and pave the way for a limited number of companies with political or commercial ties to influential entities.
When the time comes to open bids, the picture on the surface looks competitive: numerous files, bank guarantees, and offers varying in price. But behind closed doors, technicalities become weapons: a missing signature on a minor page, a small error in a bank statement, a rigid interpretation of a clause in the advertisement. With these pretexts, the cheapest or most professional bids are rejected, and the highest-priced offer passes as the "only one that meets the requirements."
After the contract is signed, the implementation phase begins. The materials stipulated in the contract are replaced with lower-quality ones, or the actual work on the ground is reduced while the payment amounts remain the same. Deadlines are extended under various pretexts to incur additional costs. On paper, the project is 100% complete, but in reality, the street reverts to its original state after a single rainy season, and the school requires further maintenance after a few years. It's as if the contract was merely a fleeting moment in the history of corruption, not a genuine contribution to infrastructure development.
The map of corruption: interconnected episodes, not isolated incidents.
When the scattered stories are put together, a nearly complete map of administrative and financial corruption emerges, consisting of interconnected episodes:
In the first stage, the planning and design stage, projects are chosen not always out of genuine need on the ground, but rather out of political, partisan, or commercial interest. Estimated costs are inflated from the outset, technical specifications are written in a way that makes genuine competition virtually impossible, and professional firms are eliminated early on because they are unable to participate in the game of "understandings."
In the second phase, the bidding and committee phase, corruption is reproduced under a legal guise. Committees formed based on loyalty rather than expertise, they cling to the wording of instructions and selectively apply them to disqualify specific bids: a note on a seal, a narrow interpretation of a clause, or an insistence on a particular model unrelated to the core of the service. Behind the scenes, certain companies collude to divide up tenders over years, forming a kind of cartel that prevents prices from falling below a certain ceiling and ensures costs remain above normal market levels.
In the third phase, the implementation phase, the narrative shifts to incomplete works: thinner roads, lower-quality cement in buildings, used or substandard equipment presented as "modern," and repeated extensions of the construction period with additional cost requests. The result is fragile structures that have a lifespan far shorter than the money spent on them, while the opening photos and the perfunctory ribbon-cutting ceremony are used as proof of "completion."
At the fourth level, we see "petty, everyday corruption": the citizen asked for a "small sum" to expedite a transaction, the employee whose file remains inactive until a so-called "bribe" is paid, and contracts shrouded in verbal instructions to "favor a certain entity." This level doesn't generate sensational headlines, but it shapes societal behavior, leading citizens to believe that their rights can only be obtained through additional payment, and employees to view their positions as opportunities for personal gain rather than a duty to public service.
At a higher level, "political-administrative corruption" exists at the intersection of money and power; positions are distributed based on patronage rather than merit; sensitive posts in ministries and agencies are granted as shares of the state's "pie"; and ministries are sometimes run as reservoirs of campaign funds through contracts and projects. In this context, any genuine administrative reform becomes a threat to entrenched networks of vested interests, not merely a regulatory decision.
Then comes the final stage: oversight. Here, it is determined whether corruption is a high-cost risk or an "investment" with limited potential for loss. Files are opened and then closed under the pretext of "insufficient evidence," cases become bargaining chips in negotiations between powerful entities, and financial settlements allow for the recovery of a portion of the money in exchange for reduced sentences or the case being dropped altogether. With this scenario repeated, corrupt individuals develop the conviction that the worst that can happen in the end is a settlement they can tolerate.
Silent administrative corruption: When the state becomes a private resource
Aside from major deals and huge contracts, experts draw attention to a less visible layer in the media but no less influential on the state’s performance, which can be called “silent administrative corruption”: the consumption of state resources as if it were a personal privilege rather than a public trust.
In this context, anti-corruption expert Ali al-Habib explained to Baghdad Today that a significant part of the problem lies not only in the contract figures but also in the daily practices within institutions; from government vehicles used for personal errands to equipment and technical infrastructure employed outside of work-related activities, and even working hours wasted on tasks unrelated to serving the public. This pattern, as al-Habib points out, represents an indirect waste of public funds, but it is no less damaging than any corrupt deal because it undermines public trust in the state and fosters a culture of exploiting resources within government departments.
Al-Habib adds that the surplus of staff in some ministries has transformed a large part of the administrative apparatus into a bloated entity; departments overcrowded with employees without real tasks, coupled with a clear shortage of vital specialists. This translates into slow processing of transactions and poor service quality. He attributes this to weak human resources planning, the absence of precise job descriptions, and unprofessional interference in appointments. He emphasizes that any serious reform must involve readjusting the relationship between employees and public resources, strengthening governance and digital oversight systems, and redistributing personnel according to actual needs instead of unplanned numerical expansion.
In this way, silent administrative corruption becomes the behavioral foundation upon which large deals stand; when a junior employee gets used to exploiting time and resources, exploiting a large contract is no longer a surprising behavior in the eyes of the system.
About the numbers and reports that don't change the picture
For more than two decades, hundreds of local and international reports have been issued describing the extent of corruption in Iraq as one of the highest rates in the world. Estimates speak of the loss or waste of hundreds of billions of dollars since 2003, in the form of inflated contracts, projects that were not properly implemented, and money that left the banking system and did not return.
In contrast, regulatory bodies announce annually sums "recovered" or "retained" for the treasury, and thousands of cases opened against employees of various ranks. These figures may seem large on their own, but when placed in the context of the overall amount of wasted funds, they appear as only a small part of the picture.
There are also recurring high-profile scandals known in the media by striking names, revealing networks capable of embezzling huge sums from a single institution or account within a short period of time. Then, the full details of how these networks were built and who is behind them are missing, so the focus remains on a limited number of names, while the broader structure remains outside the circle of accountability.
Why is nothing moving despite all this?
Faced with this picture, a question arises that many citizens ask bitterly: If the numbers are public, the files are exposed, and the scandals are repeated, why do we not witness a real collapse of the corruption networks or a clear change in the quality of services that people receive?
Part of the answer lies in the conflict of political interests; many of those involved in major cases are linked to partisan, economic, or tribal networks, making their prosecution as much a political decision as a legal one. Any move to address a major case immediately disrupts delicate balances between influential forces, often leading to the freezing or settlement of cases rather than their pursuit to independent conclusions.
Another aspect relates to the politicization of the anti-corruption campaign itself; some cases are used as weapons in the conflict, opened at the moment of confrontation with an adversary, then closed or downplayed upon reaching a settlement or forming a new alliance. This selective use undermines the system's credibility, making the arrest of someone in a major case followed by their release without convincing explanations to the public a recurring, rather than an exception, scenario.
The administrative system also suffers from legislative and procedural loopholes that sometimes allow for settlements, statutes of limitations, or reduction of penalties with the length of trials, which opens the door to an undeclared “negotiation” in some cases: part of the money is recovered or compensation is provided, then the sentence is reduced or the case is transferred to another, less sensitive category.
In addition, there is a weakness in the systems for protecting whistleblowers and investigative journalists, as uncovering corruption files requires employees who speak out and a press that pursues the documents, but the price of speaking out is still high in many cases, which pushes many to remain silent or to leak anonymously, which alone is not enough to build a fully-fledged case.
With scandals recurring without tangible results in services or daily life, society becomes a little tired; people's ability to keep pushing decreases, and news of corruption becomes part of "daily noise" that quickly passes through the news cycle, instead of becoming a driving force for a long path of accountability.
Between the map and reality... what can change?
So, what would a radical reduction in corruption at the state level mean? In practical terms, every dinar prevented from being siphoned off through inflated contracts, dubious deals, and silent administrative corruption translates into additional financial space in the budget, instead of perpetuating the chronic deficit the country is currently experiencing. If a reasonable portion of these drains were plugged, the resulting surplus would not only be reflected in the treasury figures but also in the state's ability to finance infrastructure and essential services without constant borrowing or entering into harsh negotiations with international institutions and influential countries.
At that point, the budget becomes an instrument of sovereignty, not a deficit document. The government's need for the economic and financial concessions often demanded as conditions for aid or exemptions diminishes, and the scope for external pressure, whether from the United States or others, shrinks. This is because the power of any international actor to impose its conditions stems first and foremost from the fragility of the domestic economy and the weakness of public finances. Conversely, when citizens see that public funds are no longer being wasted at the same rate, and that schools, roads, and hospitals truly reflect the figures being announced, their trust in the political class and state institutions will gradually increase. The slogan of combating corruption will transform from a recurring phrase in official statements into a tangible reality in daily life. With this shift, the balance of power between the state and society, on the one hand, and between the state and any external party attempting to use economic leverage as a tool for imposing its will or for blackmail, on the other, will change.
Corruption in Iraq, as this map reveals, is not merely a series of "thefts," but rather a complete system of governance: from the moment a project is proposed, to the way its contracts are drafted, to the selection of those in charge, to how those involved are dealt with when negligence or crime is exposed. Unless the issue is viewed in this structural light, reports, investigations, and arrest warrants will remain fleeting news items in the daily lives of Iraqis; they read them, shake their heads in dismay, and then go out the next day to walk the same streets that the "completed" contracts spoke of, and their children sit in schools that were supposedly "upgraded," while the walls and ceilings tell a different story.
Redefining public service as a trust, not a prize; linking every dinar and every hour of work to a clear performance indicator; protecting whistleblowers instead of punishing them; and keeping the judiciary and oversight bodies neutral from political deals of the moment; these are not idealistic slogans, but rather the minimum conditions for transforming corruption from an imposed fate into a behavior that can be contained and its perpetrators held accountable, even if gradually.
