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The writing on the image says The file to remove zeros enters advanced stages ... and a plan to replace the Iraqi currency in early 2027.
MP Murtadha Afween confirmed on Monday that the project to remove zeros from the Iraqi currency has not yet moved to the implementation phase, indicating that the project does not represent a direct solution to the crises plaguing the Iraqi economy.
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Afween told the Information Agency that "the issue of removing zeros from the currency has not yet reached the implementation phase," explaining that "the project has not contributed to addressing the crises facing the Iraqi economy."
He added that "removing zeros from the currency, if it proceeds, should not be considered a sufficient measure to address the economic challenges," noting "the importance of focusing on issues directly related to the country's economic and financial reality."
Afween pointed out that "addressing the economic crises requires concrete steps and measures targeting the root causes of the problems, in addition to developing solutions for issues affecting financial and economic stability," emphasizing that "monetary measures alone are insufficient to address the accumulated economic problems." Earlier, The Media Line network revealed in a report that the Iraqi government will begin issuing a new currency with zeros removed at the beginning of 2027.
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Sources told Al-Mustaqilla that the plan to remove zeros from the Iraqi currency is entering advanced stages, with a plan to replace the currency in early 2027.
Informed sources revealed to Al-Mustaqilla that the file of removing zeros from the Iraqi dinar and reissuing the currency has entered advanced stages of study and discussion within government departments, noting that a plan currently circulating aims to begin the process of replacing the old currency with a new currency starting from 2027, in the event that the required governmental, legislative and technical approvals are completed.
The sources said that the currency restructuring file is no longer limited to economic and technical discussions within the Central Bank of Iraq, but has become subject to study at the level of the Prime Minister’s office, within a plan related to the mechanism for moving from the current currency to a new monetary issuance after removing the zeros.
According to information obtained by Al-Mustaqila, the discussions are currently focused on developing a clear implementation plan for the replacement process, the transitional period during which the two currencies will be traded, the mechanisms for banks and government institutions to deal with the new currency, as well as the procedures related to bringing the largest possible amount of cash outside the banking sector into the formal financial system.
The sources confirmed that 2027 is among the current proposals as a possible start date for the process of replacing the old currency with the new one, but stressed that the date will not become officially effective before the completion of the governmental and legislative process and obtaining the required approvals.
The sources expected that the file would witness developments at the Cabinet level in the coming period, followed – if the project is approved – by moving to the required legislative path before reaching the implementation stage.
Mustafa Sand's statements bring the issue back to the forefront.
The new information coincides with previous statements by Iraqi Communications Minister Mustafa Sanad, who said during August that a decision regarding the removal of zeros and the change of currency had been decided at the political level, and linked the move to bringing out hoarded funds and returning them to the economic cycle and the banking system.
Sand said that the currency change process could encourage holders of large amounts of cash to reveal their money when exchanging old banknotes, allowing some of the liquidity outside banks to be brought back into the financial system, as well as dealing with money whose owners cannot prove its sources or bring it legally into the exchange process.
Sand’s statements had sparked widespread controversy, especially after the government said on August 17 that the Cabinet had not made a final decision at that time to remove the zeros, and that implementing such a step required a legislative process that went through the House of Representatives.
The Central Bank denies printing... but outlines the course of any future project
On August 26, 2026, the Central Bank of Iraq issued a statement explicitly denying reports that it had printed quantities of new Iraqi currency with zeros removed in preparation for its release into the markets.
However, the bank’s statement did not close the door to a future currency restructuring project, as it confirmed that any such project, if an official decision is made regarding it, will be subject to multiple legal, regulatory and technical stages, and that it will be officially announced and a transition period will be determined that allows citizens, banks and institutions to exchange the currency in an organized and safe manner.
This means that the official denial issued by the Central Bank so far relates to the existence of a new currency that has been printed and is ready for circulation, and not to the cancellation of the project idea or the exclusion of discussing it in the future.
Al-Mustaqilla has been following the case since its inception.
Al-Mustaqilla had published a series of reports in recent days on the issue of removing zeros and restructuring the currency, in which it quoted sources close to decision-making circles as saying that the matter was under serious study, despite the fact that no final government announcement had been issued yet.
Information obtained by “Al-Mustaqila” today confirms that the file is still in existence and under study within the relevant institutions, and that the discussions have moved to more advanced details regarding how to implement the replacement process and not just the idea in principle.
However, the sources confirmed at the same time that the project’s transition to the actual implementation phase will remain linked to the final decision of the Council of Ministers, the legislative procedures required by the file, and the position of the Central Bank, as it is the entity responsible for managing and issuing currency and monetary policy in Iraq.
Why does the government want to change the currency?
The proposed plans suggest that the project’s objectives are not limited to reducing the number of zeros and facilitating accounting and monetary operations, but could also include reorganizing the large amount of cash that exists outside the banking system.
Iraq is one of the economies that relies heavily on cash transactions, and a large percentage of the currency in circulation is outside of banks.
The latest data circulating on monetary indicators indicates that the volume of currency circulating outside the banking sector has reached more than 100 trillion dinars, which reflects the extent of the hoarding phenomenon and reliance on direct cash.
Currency replacement – if the government adopts clear control mechanisms – would encourage hoarders to deposit their money through banks or exchange centers within a specific time period, giving financial authorities greater ability to know the movement of money and the sources of some large cash blocks.
The process can also support anti-money laundering and anti-financing measures if it is accompanied by the application of clear rules regarding deposits, large sums, and sources of funds.
Replacement, not cancellation, of the value of citizens' money
From an economic standpoint, removing zeros does not mean that citizens' money will lose its value or that the dinar will automatically become more expensive.
If it is decided – for example – to remove three zeros, then renaming the monetary unit could make every thousand dinars of the old currency equivalent to one dinar of the new currency, in parallel with repricing salaries, prices, debts, contracts and balances at the same rate.
The main objective of the process is to simplify monetary categories, accounts and transactions, not to achieve an automatic increase in the purchasing power of the dinar.
Expected transitional phase
If the project is approved, the authorities will likely adopt a transitional phase during which the old and new currencies will circulate simultaneously before the old version is gradually withdrawn.
The central bank had already confirmed that any future decision of this kind would include a transition period to ensure that citizens, banks and institutions could exchange currency in an orderly manner while preserving all financial rights and obligations.
The process will require resetting banking systems, ATMs, accounting software, pricing, contracts and government records, as well as a broad awareness campaign to prevent the transition from being exploited for fraud or speculation.
The coming days could be decisive.
According to sources from “Al-Mustaqilla”, the next stage will be important in determining the final course of the project, while the governmental, legal and technical aspects of the currency replacement plan continue to be studied.
The sources confirmed that there is a trend to push the file towards completing the necessary procedures, with the picture to become clearer after the Cabinet's position and the legislative process are decided.
Accordingly, the information available so far indicates that the project to change the currency and remove zeros is moving within Iraqi institutions, and that 2027 is being considered as a possible start date for the replacement process according to the ideas being discussed. However, this has not yet turned into an official, announced, and binding date from the Central Bank or the Council of Ministers as of the date of this report.
The Iraqi public is waiting for any official announcement in the coming days that could move one of the most sensitive financial issues in the country from the stage of studies and discussions to the stage of decision and implementation
Money exchange companies under the microscope of the Central Bank of Iraq: strict oversight and anticipated updates.
The relationship between the Central Bank of Iraq and exchange companies and offices is heading towards a more stringent stage in monitoring the movement of funds and transfers, in conjunction with official moves to reorganize the sector and raise compliance and governance requirements, according to a source close to the exchange market and official data reviewed by Al-Mustaqilla.
The source, who preferred not to reveal his name, told Al-Mustaqilla’s correspondent that exchange companies and offices are currently subject to stricter monitoring, and that the coming period may witness updates in the mechanisms for linking and exchanging information with the Central Bank, allowing for more accurate monitoring of operations and transfers, especially foreign transactions.
The Central Bank has not yet announced details about a new electronic system to link exchange companies or when it will be implemented, and Al-Mustaqilla was unable to independently verify the nature of the updates referred to by the source.
But the bank's actions over the past three months support a clear trend towards tighter oversight of the sector.
On June 10, the Central Bank asked exchange companies of categories (A and B) and companies that mediate the buying and selling of foreign currencies to provide it with data relating to their bank accounts, and said that the measure comes “for regulatory and supervisory purposes.”
On July 6, the bank withdrew the licenses of Al-Rawajeb, Saba and Al-Nitaq companies to mediate the buying and selling of foreign currencies, attributing the decision to violations of sector regulation controls.
Two weeks later, Central Bank Governor Nizar Nasser Hussein held a meeting with the directors and chairmen of exchange companies, and said that the next phase would witness new initiatives and activities to expand their businesses, in parallel with raising compliance and governance levels in accordance with international standards.
These measures coincided with broader commitments made by Iraq under a joint action plan with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to strengthen the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. In August, the bank issued a new circular on behavioral indicators for transactions suspected of being linked to money laundering or terrorist financing, following a training program in which banking and non-banking financial institutions participated.
Exchange companies are already subject to special anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulations issued by the Central Bank in 2024, as part of its supervision of non-bank financial institutions.
These steps indicate that the next phase may not be limited to regulating currency sales, but may extend to increasing oversight of the sources of funds, transfer routes, and beneficiaries.
The extent of the expected change remains linked to the instructions that will be issued by the Central Bank, particularly whether it will adopt a more centralized system to link exchange companies and monitor their transactions directly.
The dollar is still being sold in the Iraqi parallel market at a significant difference from the price announced by the Central Bank, despite a series of banking and regulatory measures implemented by the authorities during the past months in an attempt to restructure the financial sector and expand official channels for obtaining foreign currency.
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The selling price of $100 at Baghdad exchange bureaus reached approximately 154,500 dinars at the close of trading on Saturday, August 29, the same price as at the Al-Kifah and Al-Harithiya exchanges. Meanwhile, the Central Bank offers the dollar at 1,310 dinars, equivalent to 131,000 dinars per $100. This leaves a difference of approximately 23,500 dinars, or about 18 percent, between the Central Bank's rate and the cash selling price in the market.
The figures do not reflect a steady upward trend for the dollar. The selling price in Baghdad reached about 156,000 dinars in some sessions in June before it declined, but at the end of August it remained higher than its level at the end of January when it was selling for about 151,000 dinars per 100 dollars.
This means that the new measures have not yet led to a permanent narrowing of the gap between the two prices to limited levels, despite a major change in the way Iraq manages trade finance and access to foreign currency.
Since the beginning of 2025, Iraq has moved from an electronic platform through which the Central Bank oversaw foreign transfers to a system in which commercial banks rely on their accounts and relationships with correspondent banks abroad, while the Central Bank finances those accounts and oversees compliance.
The International Monetary Fund said last year that the transition to the new system had succeeded in reducing the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates at that stage, but it also said that further narrowing the gap required facilitating access to foreign currency, tightening customs controls to curb smuggling and informal trade, and promoting the use of the dinar in local transactions.
But the widening gap again in 2026 indicates that reforming the transfer mechanism alone was not enough to eliminate demand outside the formal system.
The central bank said in June that it was committed to meeting legitimate demand for dollars and maintaining exchange rate stability, and that its reform program included reintegrating Iraqi banks into foreign transfers, expanding their relationships with correspondent banks, improving electronic payments, and complying with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards.
In July, Central Bank Governor Nizar Nasser Hussein announced that, following discussions with the US Treasury Department, an understanding had been reached allowing restricted Iraqi banks to return to foreign correspondent banking channels in currencies other than the dollar after they met compliance and governance requirements.
The bank said that seven banks have become eligible for this stage, and that they can regain eligibility to deal in dollars later after passing additional requirements.
In the same month, the Central Bank withdrew the licenses of three companies that mediated the buying and selling of foreign currencies, namely Al-Rawajeb, Saba and Al-Nitaq, due to their violation of the sector's regulatory controls. Then, it held meetings with exchange companies to discuss reorganizing their operations and raising compliance and governance levels.
The policy towards cash dollars also witnessed another change. In July, Iraqi media published a directive from the Central Bank allowing banks to deliver some foreign remittances and incoming dollar deposits to their owners in the same currency, according to specific controls, in a move that would increase the banking system's ability to meet the legitimate demand for foreign currency.
However, the parallel market did not disappear.
This is partly due to the nature of demand, which does not all pass through the banking system. The IMF stated in its report on Iraq that the remaining difference between the two exchange rates reflects, among other factors, informal trade, demand for dollars for activities that cannot access regulated channels, and speculation.
The central bank itself had previously stated in clarifications that part of the parallel demand comes from traders who do not use official import methods, or from trade that does not pass through regular customs ports, or from prohibited activities, which makes providing dollars for legitimate transactions insufficient on its own to eliminate the informal market.
Iraq's financial relationship with the United States and its trade with Iran add another layer of complexity.
Reuters reported last week that Iraq's reliance on the dollar-based financial system gives Washington significant leverage over its financial sector, at a time when Iraq maintains extensive economic ties with Iran. According to figures cited by the agency, Iraqi-Iranian trade exceeded $10 billion in 2025.
In recent years, the United States has also imposed restrictions and sanctions on Iraqi banks that it said were involved in transactions linked to Iran, prompting the central bank to tighten compliance requirements and restructure the relationship of Iraqi banks with the international financial system.
This reveals a paradox facing Iraqi monetary policy: stricter compliance reduces the risks of sanctions and money laundering and brings banks closer to the international financial system, but at the same time it may leave a portion of demand that is unable or unwilling to go through official procedures heading to the parallel market.
Therefore, the market rate alone does not provide a complete measure of the success of banking reform. Restructuring banks, improving governance, expanding their international relationships, and subjecting remittances to scrutiny are objectives that extend beyond the daily exchange rate.
However, a persistent gap approaching 18 percent is at the same time an indicator that is difficult to ignore when measuring the ability of reforms to reach the real economy.
For a trader who cannot finance all of his needs through a correspondent bank, or a citizen who needs cash dollars for purposes other than those specified, the parallel market rate remains the actual rate he faces.
Herein lies the most difficult test for the Central Bank and the government of Ali al-Zaidi.
After changing the rules for foreign exchange, reopening banking channels, regulating exchange companies, and expanding dollar transactions through banks, the challenge is no longer limited to building a more compliant financial system, but has become making this system capable of competing with the parallel market in speed, access, and cost.
The experience of the first eight months of 2026 suggests that the parallel market has not yet given up.
The dollar, which was selling for about 151,000 dinars per 100 dollars at the end of January, reached 154,500 dinars at the end of August, although it fell back from the peaks it recorded in June.
Thus, what has been achieved so far seems closer to a reform of the banking structure and channels than to a complete transformation of the exchange market.
Narrowing the gap between the two prices, rather than just the number of instructions or banks that have been rehabilitated, will be one of the clearest tests of the new policy’s ability to transfer reform from the banks to the market.
Iraq Considers Currency Overhaul To Expose Looted Funds
The Iraqi government is considering introducing a new currency that would remove three zeros from the dinar to simplify transactions and bring funds looted through corruption under government control, Iraqi Communications Minister Mustafa Sanad told local media.
“There is a political decision regarding removing zeros from the national currency,” Sanad announced.
A source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office, who preferred to remain anonymous, told The Media Line, “The decision will be made in the coming period, and it is hoped that the procedures will begin during 2027.”
Iraq’s central bank released an official statement that said: “There is no decision yet to print a new Iraqi currency, and any future move to restructure currency denominations or remove zeros will be preceded by several legal and regulatory stages.”
The US dollar is currently trading at 1,320 Iraqi dinars according to the official exchange rate, while it is trading at 1,530 Iraqi dinars per dollar on the parallel black market. The Iraqi currency is considered overvalued, with Iraqis receiving salaries in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dinars, while housing units are purchased for hundreds of millions or even billions of Iraqi dinars.
Iraq’s currency consists of several denominations, the smallest being 250 dinars, and increasing to 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, 25,000, and 50,000 dinars.
According to observers and politicians, the move, if approved, would be part of the government’s broader campaign against corruption, which has already targeted several politicians. These campaigns led to the discovery of trillions of dinars hidden on the farms or in the homes of some politicians.
The currency in their possession will become worthless without being exchanged for the new currency, which will lead to the discovery of even more of these funds or the confiscation from those holding them.
The Iraqi government is turning to American banks for loans to resolve its liquidity crisis.
An informed source revealed on Sunday that the government intends to approach some American banks to obtain a financial loan as a quick solution to overcome the liquidity crisis, away from proposals to print currency.
The source explained to Shafaq News Agency that "the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs are considering contacting some official American banks to obtain a financial loan that will be repaid from Iraqi oil sales in global oil markets, thus solving the liquidity crisis away from the proposal to print currency locally."
The source added that "the Iraqi government sees this approach as a logical and quick solution amid the wave of crises that the region is witnessing," without revealing further details.
The law on borrowing, grants and subsidies is an exceptional and temporary measure that Iraq is moving towards enacting, to compensate for the absence of the federal budget and to secure the necessary government spending.
The Iraqi parliament is waiting for the government to officially send the draft borrowing law to parliament, in order to avoid a financial gap and to ensure that the law does not differ from the vision and policy of the Iraqi government, according to the parliamentary finance committee.
Earlier, a special monitoring conducted by Shafaq News Agency showed that the volume of Iraqi currency issuance rose to 113.560 trillion dinars in May 2026, an increase of about 13.761 trillion dinars, or 13.8%, compared to the end of December 2025, amid escalating financial pressures that prompted the government to seek liquidity to ensure the payment of salaries and basic expenses.
Washington outlines its partnership with Baghdad: An Iraq free of terrorism and weapons in the hands of the state.
A spokesman for the US State Department confirmed on Sunday that Iraq has begun a new path under the leadership of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, and in full partnership with the United States.
The ministry spokesman told Shafaq News Agency that "Washington, as emphasized by US President Donald Trump during his meeting with Prime Minister al-Zaidi on the historic visit on July 14, strongly supports the Iraqi government's vision for a better and brighter future for all Iraqis, free from terrorism."
He added that "the United States clearly supports efforts to prevent the execution or launching of any attacks from within or through Iraqi territory," noting that "proceeding with the process of controlling and restricting weapons to the state is a fundamental pillar for enhancing security and stability in Iraq."
The spokesman explained that "restricting weapons to the state would reduce the threats that armed factions and groups may pose, and create a stable security environment that would allow for building a strong and mutually beneficial partnership between Baghdad and Washington."
The issue of armed factions is one of the most sensitive issues facing the Iraqi government, with the approach of September 30, which the main political forces have set as the deadline for restricting weapons to official institutions.
The State Administration Coalition, which includes the most prominent Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish political forces, stressed during its meeting on August 5 the need to restrict weapons to the state, and considered the parties that carry out activities that threaten the security of the country outside the framework of official institutions as “outlaws and must be fought.”
The coalition warned that any armed activity outside the framework of the state after September 30 would be dealt with according to the anti-terrorism law.
Following this, Iraqi security and military forces raised their readiness level throughout the country, and the leave of a number of commanders and officers was cancelled, while security agencies began implementing field movements and exercises in anticipation of any emergency or friction that might develop into an armed confrontation.
Last week, Baghdad witnessed hours of security tension coinciding with threats by armed factions to retaliate against Saudi Arabia after strikes targeted Popular Mobilization Forces sites, before it ended with contacts and a dawn meeting between Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zubaidi and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, which led to a mutual calming and opened the way for diplomatic action to address the crisis.
Al-Amiri later called on the "Islamic Resistance" factions to postpone any military response against Saudi Arabia and to prioritize "Iraq's higher interest," but he returned and stressed during a meeting with a number of Popular Mobilization Forces leaders the importance of maintaining a high level of readiness.
The plan to restrict weapons does not have a unified stance from the armed factions.
While some forces expressed a willingness to reorganize their military and security relationship with the state, other factions, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, announced their refusal to relinquish their military capabilities, and linked any discussion about their weapons to the end of the presence of foreign forces and ensuring the protection of Iraq from external attacks.
September 30th also coincides with the deadlines related to ending the international coalition's military presence in Iraq, which some factions use as a basis forlinking the future of their weapons to the withdrawal of foreign forces.
The United States “strongly supports” Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi’s vision for the country and his efforts to prevent attacks in and from Iraqi territory, a US State Department spokesperson told Shafaq News on Sunday.
“Iraq has embarked on a new direction under the leadership of Prime Minister Al-Zaidi in full partnership with the United States,” the spokesperson said, citing his July 14 White House meeting with President Donald Trump and a shared goal of securing a future “free from terrorism” alongside a “strong and mutually beneficial US-Iraq partnership.”
US backing for Al-Zaidi preceded his appointment. Following his April 30 nomination, Trump congratulated him, extended an invitation to Washington, and called for a “strong, vibrant, and highly productive new relationship” with Baghdad.
Bringing weapons under state control has since become a central policy of Al-Zaidi’s government. During his White House visit, the prime minister said that some armed factions had already surrendered their arms, an issue long raised by US officials seeking to prevent Iran-backed groups from carrying out attacks from Iraqi territory.
A meeting of the coordination framework is expected to discuss the completion of the cabinet.
On Sunday, Iraqi parliament member Mohammed Abu Al-Eis revealed that a meeting of the Coordination Framework forces is expected in the coming days to discuss completing the formation of the cabinet.
Abu Al-Eis told Shafaq News Agency that the framework forces have not set a specific date for completing the cabinet, and everything mentioned in this regard is speculation and not true.
Abu Al-Eis explained that "the political blocs submitted the names of the candidates for the ministerial cabinet, despite the existence of some obstacles regarding the candidates for the Ministries of Interior and Defense."
A source within the coordination framework revealed to Shafaq News Agency in the middle of this month that meetings between leaders have intensified to complete the government cabinet and select moderate candidates who are acceptable to the political parties.
The source told Shafaq News Agency that “the meetings between Shiite leaders are focusing on the mechanism for selecting candidates to fill the vacant ministerial portfolios, most importantly the Ministries of Defense and Interior.”
On May 14, 2026, the Iraqi parliament granted confidence to the government of Ali Faleh al-Zaidi and its ministerial program, and voted on 14 ministers out of 23, while nine portfolios remained postponed due to disagreements over names and quotas, including the Interior, Defense, Higher Education and Planning ministries.
In pictures: Mark Savaya's first appearance with Trump after months of disappearance
Former US Special Envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, published his first photo with [someone/someone] on Sunday.President Donald TrumpMonths after his disappearance.
Savaya commented on the photo and said, "I saw it."Alsumaria NewsHe said, "I had a great meeting with the president this morning about winning Michigan again next November."
He added, "He loves Michigan, and he's 100% focused on Michigan."
US Sanctions on Iran Could Disrupt Iraq’s Trade, Energy Supplies and Currency Market
Iraq could face significant economic repercussions from the tightening of US sanctions on Iran, with experts warning that restrictions on financial transactions could disrupt bilateral trade, increase prices and put additional pressure on the Iraqi dinar and dollar market.
The concerns come amid extensive commercial and economic ties between Baghdad and Tehran. Iraq relies on Iran for a significant share of imports, including food, agricultural products, construction materials and consumer goods, while continuing to import Iranian gas and electricity.
Economic expert Sadiq al-Rikabi told BasNews that a complete halt to official trade between Iraq and Iran would be difficult given the two countries’ long border and deeply interconnected commercial relations.
"It would be difficult to say that sanctions will completely halt trade, but they will impose major obstacles on imports and financial transfers,” al-Rikabi said.
He identified food and agricultural products as among the sectors most vulnerable to disruption, noting that Iraq imports substantial quantities of dairy products, vegetables and canned goods from Iran.
Construction materials, including ceramics, iron and pipes, could also be affected, he said, as many Iraqi companies rely on Iranian supplies because of their relatively low costs and geographic proximity. Consumer goods, plastics, cleaning products and household materials could face similar pressures.
Energy payments remain a key concern
Iraq’s electricity and gas imports from Iran are covered by US sanctions waivers, but the mechanism for settling payments remains a major challenge, according to al-Rikabi.
He noted that payments associated with Iranian electricity and gas imports had exceeded $10 billion during previous periods, warning that difficulties in settling outstanding payments could prompt Iran to reduce or suspend energy supplies.
Such a development could directly affect Iraq’s electricity generation, particularly given the continued importance of Iranian gas to the country’s power sector.
Banking restrictions could push trade into informal channels
Al-Rikabi said the main difference between the current sanctions environment and the existing trade relationship is Washington’s effort to impose financial restrictions on Iran and prevent dollars from reaching the Iranian economy.
An Iraqi trader opening a bank credit facility or letter of guarantee in favor of an Iranian company could face sanctions exposure, while transferring US dollars to Iran through the banking system would become increasingly difficult, he said.
As formal banking channels become more constrained, however, informal trade could expand through unofficial border crossings, cash transactions and barter arrangements.
Some traders could resort to exchanging Iraqi dinars for Iranian rials or physically transporting cash across the border, while others could use barter systems in which Iraqi goods are exchanged directly for Iranian products.
"The trade conducted through banks will decline significantly, but informal trade could become more active,” al-Rikabi said.
Pressure on prices and the dollar market
Despite tighter restrictions, al-Rikabi expects Iranian goods to continue entering the Iraqi market, albeit in smaller quantities and under greater scrutiny.
He warned that traders’ increased reliance on the parallel market to obtain dollars and transfer funds to Iran could raise demand for the US currency inside Iraq.
This could contribute to delays in the arrival of certain goods and drive up prices as importers face higher transaction costs and greater difficulties securing supplies.
The resulting increase in demand for dollars could also place additional pressure on the Iraqi dinar’s exchange rate.
"Iraq-Iran trade will not stop completely,” al-Rikabi said, "but sanctions and tighter controls on financial transfers will make it more expensive and complicated, with potentially direct consequences for the Iraqi economy, prices and the foreign-exchange market.”
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While the Iraqi scene is preoccupied with the controversy surrounding the withdrawal of the international coalition forces on September 30 and its repercussions on security, politics, and the economy, quiet movements are taking place in Washington, D.C., away from the media spotlight and the clamor of reporters' cameras. Among these movements, an unannounced visit by the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Mr. Masrour Barzani, to the American capital stands out. This visit has not been covered by the media up to the moment of writing these lines, but it carries within it messages that go beyond the usual diplomatic protocol. What makes this visit different is not only the absence of an official announcement about it, but also the nature of its timing, the composition of the issues on the table, and the parties with whom talks are being held behind closed doors.
The visit initially appeared to be a routine trip, perhaps combining tourism, relaxation, and possibly medical treatment. However, recent events have completely altered our understanding. According to a respected official at the Kurdistan Regional Government's representation in Washington, after being contacted and inquired about the reason for Mr. Barzani's visit with his family, it became clear that behind this unannounced visit by the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region lie layers of unseen details, unfolding behind closed doors, away from the media's gaze. This shift in information compels the press to inform the public and delve into the background of the visit, especially at this sensitive political juncture for Iraq, with the approaching withdrawal of international coalition forces and the potential repercussions on the political and economic landscape within the country. It also raises questions about the nature of the understandings being forged for the post-withdrawal period, the extent of Washington's willingness to maintain its level of support for its allies in Erbil, and whether this will lead to a reshaping of the relationship with the federal government in Baghdad. What is happening behind the scenes deserves attention and analysis, especially since the visit—its silence, its timing, and the absence of an official announcement—opens the door to possibilities that go beyond what is presented in public discourse, and prompts the deconstruction of the messages that the concerned parties are trying to convey at this critical stage. On Friday, August 28, 2026, in the state of Virginia, the American city of McLean and its famous shopping center, Tysons Galleria, a high-end and luxurious shopping center that focuses on luxury brands and upscale dining options, Mr. Masrour Barzani made a remarkable appearance with his family and his personal security detail. He is a prominent political figure and a well-known face to all members of the Iraqi community in America, and easily recognizable. However, the scene that raised questions about the nature of the visit and its objectives remains, especially since it was not announced by any official body in Erbil or Washington, and because his presence in the American capital at this time cannot be separated from the rapidly evolving political developments in Iraq and the region.
It is true that many political leaders visit Washington or Virginia unofficially for health, family, or social reasons without official government announcement. His presence in a huge shopping center in the McLean area, near Washington, D.C., is more indicative of a private visit than an official, public one. Washington is known as a city of unannounced meetings, especially when it comes to leaders with sensitive issues they wish to discuss away from the media spotlight and the cameras of journalists with the White House administration. The Tysons and McLean areas are known to be close to top hospitals and renowned medical centers. While the visit may be for medical treatment and recuperation, it will undoubtedly have strategic and political dimensions, involving discussions and closed-door meetings with some congressional leaders who manage the Iraq and Middle East portfolios, specifically Iran. Because this complex is located in the heart of the Greater Washington area (DMV), and is one of the most frequented public places by officials and foreign visitors during unofficial visits, the choice of this location is not random; it carries significant implications.
(*) Many leaders choose this complex because it offers a public environment without media fanfare. (*) It is very close to Washington, D.C. (15 minutes by car). (*) It is near the headquarters of consulting, security, and diplomatic firms that deal with Middle Eastern affairs. (*) The McLean area is home to the residences, mansions, and offices of prominent American political figures in Congress and the White House. (*) It houses consulting offices for political lobbying firms that deal with Iraqi and Kurdish issues. (*) The city of McLean and the surrounding areas in Northern Virginia boast some of the best medical centers and hospitals with high national rankings. Since McLean itself focuses more on specialized medical centers, general clinics, and same-day surgeries, major hospitals with full inpatient beds are located just minutes away in neighboring cities (such as False Church and Arlington). However, it was noted that Mr. Barzani's movements were entirely devoid of any official character; there were no political delegations, no media cameras, and no protocol arrangements. He is accompanied by a special security detail, and if we analyze this pattern of appearances from a journalistic and investigative perspective, it usually occurs when political leaders make visits: “family or medical visits interspersed with unannounced political meetings, or behind-the-scenes encounters with American officials, or even sensitive consultations that the parties do not wish to disclose to the public.” Given Mr. Barzani’s political weight, his appearance in Washington cannot be considered a mere personal visit, especially under the current circumstances. We can analyze the potential issues that Mr. Barzani might seek to discuss in Washington, including, but not limited to: 1) Supporting Ali al-Zaidi’s government and stabilizing the political balance in Baghdad: Washington is actively pursuing the issue of militias and disarmament, and considers Barzani one of the most important pillars of stability in Iraq. Any visit by him at this time could be linked to direct coordination regarding the future of the new Iraqi government. 2) The oil and gas file and Article 140: These issues cannot be resolved in Baghdad alone; they require clear American support. Mr. Barzani's presence in Washington may indicate talks on restructuring the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad. 3) The Syrian file and the SDF: Barzani is considered a key mediator in this file, and Washington relies on him to de-escalate tensions between the conflicting parties. 4) The future of American investments in the Kurdistan Region after the withdrawal on September 30: The McLean area houses economic and security companies with direct interests in the region. The visit may have an economic aspect related to attracting investments or signing new agreements. 5) Regional security arrangements: With escalating tensions in the Middle East, Washington is seeking to solidify its traditional allies, and Barzani is one of them. Mr. Barzani's appearance in Washington, at this particular time, in this specific location, and in an unofficial capacity, indicates that the visit has a complex character: personal and familial in form, and political and strategic in essence. Washington does not receive leaders of this stature without sensitive issues on the table, especially given the transformations taking place in Iraq and the region. Even if the visit were not officially announced, Barzani's mere presence at the Tysons Corner is enough to confirm that something is being discussed behind the scenes. The Iraqis Against Corruption organization, for its part, wants to clarify further for the reader and the public by analyzing the meanings, implications, and objectives of Mr. Masrour Barzani's secret visit to Washington. For us, this will certainly not be a fleeting event, but rather an indication of a new political phase taking shape in Iraq, and of a renewed role for a Kurdish leader who has long been part of the equation for regional stability. Until the details of the visit become clear, Barzani's appearance at the Tysons Corner remains a sign that Washington is taking action, and that Erbil is an essential part of this action. At this precise moment, Washington is grappling with a number of sensitive issues that cannot be ignored: the potential war with Iran and its possible redrawing of the map of influence in Iraq and Syria; the repercussions of the scheduled US withdrawal on September 30, and the security and political vacuums it will create, requiring careful planning; the problematic issue of the weapons held by pro-Iranian militias, a matter that cannot be resolved without understandings with influential forces in Iraq, foremost among them the Kurdistan Democratic Party; and the future of the complex relationship between the Syrian government and the Kurds, where Mr. Barzani plays a pivotal role in balancing the SDF and Damascus—a matter that is occupying the attention of congressional committees concerned with the Middle East. These issues, by their very nature, are not discussed publicly or presented to the media; rather, they are managed behind closed doors, where members of Congress and officials responsible for Middle East affairs meet with figures who hold the keys to influence on the ground. Barzani, as one of the leaders most adept at understanding the Iraqi and regional landscape, represents a crucial source of information and assessments for Washington, and a key partner in formulating recommendations that are subsequently submitted to the US administration. Therefore, the visit—however innocuous it may appear—carries profound political and strategic messages that transcend mere courtesies or medical checkups. It is a visit conducted behind closed doors, where undisclosed matters are discussed, visions are formulated that remain unwritten, and actions are taken that could reshape the next phase in Iraq and the region. While the details remain behind closed doors, Barzani's presence in Washington is a clear indication that something is brewing… and that the US capital is preparing for a new phase, one in which it needs to listen carefully to those who understand the intricacies of the Middle East as well as Masoud Barzani. Perhaps the irony for us is that this journalistic scoop didn't come from a media camera or an official source. We chose to respect the man's and his family's privacy and refrain from photographing him. Had he been alone, the invitation for a cup of coffee would have been perfectly normal, perhaps even a suitable opportunity to open a deep discussion about what's happening in Iraq and the endless crises and anxieties surrounding the country. But his presence with his family placed the matter in a different context; a context that demanded discretion and respect for the family's privacy, and necessitated not turning a personal moment into a public forum for political debate. Nevertheless, the idea remained in everyone's minds: that such fleeting encounters might offer an opportunity for a deeper understanding of what Iraqis are experiencing, and for hearing firsthand accounts from those responsible for the daily tragedies that are recurring in the country, far removed from official statements and media pronouncements. But at the same time, it brought with it a rare image of a visit taking place in the shadows, in which files that are not announced are discussed, and during which visions are formulated that may change the shape of the next stage in Iraq and the region. Thus, a chance encounter between some acquaintances and friends in a shopping mall turned into an investigative window that reveals to us some of the mysteries and secrets of the event: that Washington is moving… and that Erbil is part of this movement… and that what is happening behind the scenes may be much more important than what is shown in front of it.
We will keep you updated with the latest developments as soon as they reach us from our various sources inside the Green Zone and from those close to the events!
Together, hand in hand, against financial, administrative, and political corruption in Iraq!
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The Iraqi company Key Card is close to completing a deal to acquire a Jordanian company operating in the electronic payments sector, in a move that could represent the first direct investment expansion for the Iraqi company outside its local market, according to information obtained by Al-Mustaqilla from sources familiar with the course of the deal.
According to the information, the negotiations have gone beyond the exploration and initial negotiation stage, and the deal has entered advanced stages of ownership transfer procedures, with the parties nearing completion of the final steps necessary to finalize the acquisition.
Neither KeyCard nor the targeted Jordanian company has yet officially announced details of the deal, including the acquisition value, ownership percentage, or the final schedule for completing the transfer process.
From Iraq to Jordan
If the deal is completed, the transaction will represent a significant shift in the strategy of “Key Card”, which has built a broad presence in the electronic payments and financial services market in Iraq over the past years.
Acquiring an existing company in Jordan is not just about entering a new market, but it gives Key Card the ability to start from an existing operational structure, instead of building a new company, obtaining licenses, and developing a network of customers and partners from scratch.
This comes at a time when the region’s markets are moving to accelerate the shift from cash to digital payments, giving fintech companies an opportunity to expand across borders and leverage local expertise and networks.
Why might this deal be important?
The significance of the potential deal lies in the fact that it may reflect Key Card’s shift from a strategy focused on deepening its presence within Iraq to a more explicitly regional expansion strategy.
If the acquisition is completed, the Iraqi company will gain a direct foothold in the Jordanian market, which could enable it to develop new digital financial services, expand its customer base, and link its operational expertise in Iraq to growth opportunities in other markets.
The acquisition could also give the company greater ability to test its model outside of Iraq before considering other regional markets.
Jordan as a gateway to expansion
Choosing Jordan also carries economic significance.
The Jordanian market boasts a sophisticated financial sector and a regulatory framework for electronic payments, at a time when the use of digital solutions in financial services is increasing.
For an Iraqi company seeking to build a regional presence, acquiring a local player may be a way to reduce market entry risks and take advantage of local knowledge, business relationships, and existing operational infrastructure.
But the success of the deal will not be measured solely by the completion of the transfer of ownership.
The biggest question will be whether KeyCard will be able to turn the acquisition into a platform for regional growth, and whether the Jordanian company will retain its current identity and management or enter into a broader integration process within the KeyCard system.
Details of the deal are under review.
The value of the deal, the percentage of ownership that will be transferred to “Key Card”, the identity of the acquired company, and the nature of the new ownership structure remain among the most prominent details that have not yet been publicly decided.
Furthermore, the completion of any acquisition in the payments sector is usually subject to legal and regulatory requirements and approvals from the relevant authorities, which means that reaching an advanced stage of transfer of ownership does not necessarily mean that the deal is complete and final.
According to sources from “Al-Mustaqila”, the parties have reached the final stages of the ownership transfer process, with expectations that the procedures will be completed in the coming period, unless changes occur to the regulatory or commercial course of the deal.
Indicative of greater ambition
If the acquisition is officially confirmed, the event could be more than just a deal between two companies.
It would be a sign that Iraqi fintech companies are beginning to look beyond the confines of the local market, seeking to transform the growth they have achieved in Iraq into capital, expertise, and business networks that can be expanded regionally.
For KeyCard, the deal will be an early test of its ability to manage cross-border operations, operate within a different regulatory environment, and transform its geographic expansion into sustainable growth.
While awaiting official announcement, the deal remains in its final stages, but it presents KeyCard with an opportunity that could redefine its position from a leading Iraqi company in electronic payments to a regional player in the financial technology sector.
Iraq's Communications Minister Seeks Simultaneous 5G Launch Across Provinces and Kurdistan Region
Minister Mustafa Sanad says problems with the Region are simple and solvable, confirms a planned Erbil visit, and calls for a unified Iraqi front before the international community on telecommunications
Iraqi Communications Minister Mustafa Sanad confirmed on Saturday that his ministry is working toward the simultaneous launch of 5G services across Iraq's provinces and the Kurdistan Region, describing outstanding issues between Baghdad and Erbil on telecommunications as simple and manageable, and confirming that he is committed to visiting Erbil in the near future.
Speaking to the Iraqi News Agency, Sanad said that the Kurdistan Region's representative in Baghdad had submitted a written invitation from the Kurdistan Region's Prime Minister from the very first week of his ministerial tenure, and that the Region's Minister of Transport and Communications personally reaffirmed the invitation during a visit approximately one week ago. "We are determined to go to Erbil," he said.
On the outstanding issues between the federal ministry and the Kurdistan Region, Sanad described them as simple pending matters rather than structural disputes, citing as one example the internet cable running from Basra to Europe that passes through the Kurdistan Region, which requires coordination with companies operating in the Region upon arrival. He said the ministry has requested that Iraq present a unified face to the international community, and that it is possible to reach an understanding between the federal government and the Region so that international coordination passes through the federal Communications Ministry.
Sanad also addressed the question of the Region's telecommunications companies, noting that the Kurdistan Region's Communications Ministry is responsible for several operators including Korek Telecom, and that the Region does not have a dedicated telecommunications regulatory authority equivalent to the federal body. This structural difference means that when emergencies arise, the Region's operators contact the federal ministry directly rather than a regional regulatory counterpart.
On the 5G file specifically, Sanad acknowledged that the Kurdistan Region is ahead of the federal government in its preparatory steps for launching the service, and that the ministry is working to reach an agreement with the Region to synchronize the rollout so that 5G is launched simultaneously across all of Iraq rather than in a piecemeal fashion.
The minister's comments reflect a notably cooperative and constructive tone toward the Kurdistan Region at a moment when Baghdad-Erbil relations are being tested on multiple fronts simultaneously, from the militia disarmament deadline to budget allocation disputes and the broader political negotiations around the formation of the Tenth Cabinet. The telecommunications file, with its potential for a joint simultaneous 5G launch, offers one of the clearest examples of a practical area where federal-regional coordination can produce a tangible shared achievement.
Maliki says "no" to its downfall... and the factions say "yes" to weakening it: What is happening to al-Zaidi's government?
The Prime Minister faces a "difficult triad": weapons, corruption, and positions.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is facing three "no's" from his partners, as the infighting within the Shiite alliance has reached the point of threatening to "bring down the government." How did things reach this point? Three officials from Shiite parties, and others close to the government, told Al-Mada that the "coordination framework" meetings have become tense due to al-Zaidi's actions. However, Nouri al-Maliki, the former prime minister and leader of the State of Law Coalition, explicitly told journalists and analysts that he rejects "bringing down the government." He added that there are objections to the government's performance, but the solution is not to "bring down the government." The Cabinet: Weapons Enter the Equation.
The issue of completing the cabinet, the latest in a series of disputes, appears to be the most sensitive, especially after it became linked to the issue of weapons, a thorny topic in the relationship between the government and the factions. Sources say that Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, is insisting that the position of deputy prime minister be allocated to his group. Despite red flags from Washington against "al-Khazali's group," his nominee for the position is the most sensitive. Al-Khazali is putting forward his brother Laith for the position, a figure who has been on the US Treasury's sanctions list for years due to accusations of "oil smuggling." An advisor within the "Coordination Framework" says that placing controversial figures at the head of state institutions threatens the government's stability, making it difficult to deal with the United States and the West and to conclude contracts and agreements. This difficulty appears to be escalating due to the severe restrictions imposed by Washington last week on Iran, which would make Baghdad's position even more precarious should it violate them. The advisor adds, quoting what transpired in a meeting of the Shiite alliance: "We will be subject to sanctions like
Iran, but they are objecting to al-Zaidi because of this issue." Washington's sanctions... and the Central Bank intervenes. The Central Bank of Iraq froze the bank accounts of 14 individuals and 19 companies, some of which operate in the oil and trade sectors, in what appeared to coincide with the new sanctions. But the issue is not limited to Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. Other factions also want a share of the remaining positions, a move that Washington rejects. According to leaks, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq is also waiting for the Ministry of Labor. Abu Ala al-Walai, leader of the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (Brigades of the Master of Martyrs), for whose capture Washington has offered a reward, also wants a ministerial post.
The group of Ahmed al-Asadi, the Minister of Labor, who leads a faction, is wanted by the judiciary, and is currently a fugitive in Australia, is also demanding a position, along with two other factions. Four deputy prime ministers?! And the problem doesn't end there. There are demands for three more deputy prime ministers, bringing the total to four, due to the intense competition for these positions. It is believed that some ministries could be split, such as separating antiquities from culture, as the faction of former Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani wants an additional ministry, in addition to the oil and electricity portfolios that went to Faleh al-Fayyad, the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, who broke away from al-Sudani. There is also the issue of the share allocated to a group whose leader, Muthanna al-Samarrai, is currently imprisoned. Added to this is the predicament of Nouri al-Maliki, who insists on obtaining the Ministries of Interior and Higher Education, amid a dispute with other forces and the rejection of some candidates. More than a week ago, Maliki's office denied any understandings regarding relinquishing the Interior Ministry portfolio. Maliki had previously failed in May to secure parliamentary approval for Qasim Atta and Amer al-Khuza'i for the two ministries, out of nine that remain vacant. Money, positions, and corruption... the dispute takes on a different form , but the crisis surrounding the completion of the government extends beyond mere power-sharing. A former member of parliament says the crisis is intertwined with corruption and disarmament issues, and there is a threat to withdraw ministers to bring down the government. Al-Zidi does not appear to be backing down on the anti-corruption campaign, as it threatens his nascent political
project. Mashreq al-Fariji, a member of the al-Sudani coalition, told Al-Mada that the pursuit of corruption is based on "judicial orders, and there are no exceptions for any figure or leader. There are no levels involved, as it has reached all levels." Al-Fariji believes this is "a positive thing" for the Prime Minister, the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the Integrity Commission, saying, "These three institutions work closely together and achieve good results." But this contradicts some hints from Shiite leaders who speak openly about this issue being relevant to everyone without exception. Regarding the weapons file, there are clear threats against al-Zaydi should he approach that issue. In recent weeks, Tehran appears to have directly intervened in rearranging priorities. Through intensive visits over the past two weeks, Iran managed to transform September 30th into a deadline solely for the withdrawal of US forces, after it was initially supposed to be linked to disarmament as well. Here, the equation becomes more complex; al-Zaydi faces objections within the Shiite political establishment whenever he approaches issues that some factions consider red lines, while Baghdad simultaneously tries to avoid a confrontation with both Washington and Tehran. How will the government fall? Mohammed Naanaa, an academic and political analyst, says, "No one wants to bring down this government," explaining that its fall "will not come through protests, a military coup, chaos, or any of the other scenarios used to topple it." He adds to Al-Mada: “There is not a single piece of information, nor has any party discussed this matter behind the scenes, nor have the security services uncovered any information or meetings of this kind.” However, the absence of a plan to overthrow the government does not mean the absence of reasons for tension. According to Na’na’ – and here he agrees with sources close to the meetings of the Shiite coalition – the government faces four issues that, at every turn, become a pretext for threatening its downfall. These issues are:
The state's monopoly on weapons: where the state's logic faces resistance in favor of the ideological idea, and talk about weapons is linked to accusations of targeting "Shiite rule".
Combating corruption: The continuation of investigations is portrayed as targeting specific entities and components to hinder their progress.
Foreign relations: particularly the openness towards Syria and Saudi Arabia, which faces accusations of treason and causing the return of terrorist threats.
The Iranian file: By insisting on keeping Baghdad hostage to regional developments and casting doubt on any move towards independence and prioritizing Iraq's higher interests, the real battle lies between the fear of "overthrow" and the inevitability of "weakening." Political analyst Ghalib al-Da'mi speaks to Al-Mada about a maneuver behind the scenes of the Shiite alliance. In his view, talk of overthrowing the government is nothing new; it's "a constant refrain we hear with the formation of any government," and it's often part of the tools used to threaten and pressure the government. In this context, al-Da'mi interprets Nouri al-Maliki's rejection of "overthrowing the government" as a rejection of its destruction, not an open mandate for its head. He says, "Overthrowing this government is destroying it," but he points out, on the other hand, that there are attempts to weaken it.
Herein, according to al-Da'mi, lies the real battle: "The attempt to weaken it, yes, there are attempts to weaken the government and obstruct its projects that bring it closer to public opinion." According to this interpretation, the objective is not necessarily to remove al-Zaidi from his position, but rather to keep him within the framework of the partners. A government exists, but it is less able to act, and less able to transform its projects into an independent political and popular asset.
Iraq Prepares for US-Led Coalition Withdrawal by September 30
The Iraqi government remains firm on completing the withdrawal of coalition forces by September 30, 2026.
The Kurdistan Region is urgently requesting advanced air defense systems to counter persistent drone and missile threats.
Coalition financial support for the Peshmerga will cease post-withdrawal, transitioning solely to training, logistics, and reform assistance.
A specialized federal committee has been formed to structure bilateral military coordination, with evacuated bases transferring to Peshmerga control.
In a statement, sources confirmed that federal and regional authorities are actively negotiating security arrangements ahead of the scheduled September 30 deadline for ending the coalition's military mission in Iraq.
Key Statements and Focus Area
Regional Security Demands: Kurdistan Region Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed emphasized that ongoing talks with Baghdad and Washington focus on securing advanced air defense systems to prevent security vacuums left by departing coalition assets.
Peshmerga Assistance Shifts: Former Peshmerga Ministry Secretary-General Jabar Yawar noted that while direct financial stipends will end after September 30, technical, logistical, and reform-oriented backing will persist.
Base Handovers: Joint Operations Command spokesperson Sabah Noman stated that Prime Minister Ali Zeidi ordered a specialized committee to oversee future relations, ensuring that military outposts vacated by coalition forces are handed over directly to the Peshmerga.
The transition marks a pivotal turning point in Iraq's defense posture, shifting from international coalition-led operations to bilateral security frameworks. Both federal and regional commanders continue to evaluate logistical requirements to maintain counter-terrorism readiness and airspace protection.
FYI
The US-led coalition has operated in Iraq since 2014 under an invitation from the Iraqi government to support military campaigns against ISIS. The upcoming 2026 transition represents a complete pivot toward bilateral defense cooperation, focusing on institutional reform, intelligence sharing, and specialized tactical training.
EU Chancellor: We have no connection to the international coalition and will begin a two-year mission in Iraq
The head of the European Union's advisory mission in Iraq, Ralf Schroeder, confirmed on Sunday that there is no connection between the mission and the US-led international coalition forces, which are expected to leave Iraq at the end of September. He also revealed preparations to launch a new two-year mission in the country starting in November.
Schroeder said during a press conference in Erbil that the assistance provided by the group does not include logistical aspects, but is limited to supporting initiatives to redraft laws and providing strategic advice on police training programs and policies, noting that the Dutch police are currently working on direct coordination with the Erbil police.
Regarding the threat of ISIS and the security problems in the disputed areas, the head of the mission explained that their mandate is limited to civilian security only, adding: “We do not have direct contact with the army, and in the Kurdistan Region our work is limited to coordination with the police and the internal security forces (Asayish).”
Iranian media reported on Sunday evening that new explosions had been heard in Iran.
According to media reports: An explosion was heard again on Lark Island.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard confirmed a short while ago that a number of its members were killed in an American attack on Larak Island.
In a statement, the Revolutionary Guard indicated that a number of its members and citizens were killed and wounded in the American attack on Larak Island, vowing to respond and "punish the aggressor."
He believed that "the enemy's attack on Lark Island came as a result of its inability to solve its internal problems and the decline in its standing among the countries of the region."
Axios reported that US forces targeted two Iranian launch pads on Larak Island after preparations were detected by the Revolutionary Guard to launch missiles loaded with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz, while Tasnim News Agency announced that two people were killed and two others were injured as a result of the targeting.
Earlier, CENTCOM confirmed that US forces had successfully removed naval mines planted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard from international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz.
The Revolutionary Guard confirms the death of a number of its members in the "Lark" attack
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard confirmed on Sunday evening that a number of its members were killed in an American attack on Larak Island.
In a statement, the Revolutionary Guard indicated that a number of its members and citizens were killed and wounded in the American attack on Larak Island, vowing to respond and "punish the aggressor."
He believed that "the enemy's attack on Lark Island came as a result of its inability to solve its internal problems and the decline in its standing among the countries of the region."
Axios reported that US forces targeted two Iranian launch pads on Larak Island after preparations were detected by the Revolutionary Guard to launch missiles loaded with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz, while Tasnim News Agency announced that two people were killed and two others were injured as a result of the targeting.
Earlier, CENTCOM confirmed that US forces had successfully removed naval mines planted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard from international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz.
US official: We bombed two Iranian missile launch sites on Larak Island
The Axios news website, citing a US official, reported on Sunday that US forces targeted two Iranian launch pads on Larak Island in Hormozgan province, southern Iran.
The unnamed official indicated that the targeting came after "preparations were detected by Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces to launch missiles loaded with naval mines into the Strait of Hormuz."
For its part, the Iranian news agency Tasnim reported that "two people were killed and two others were injured as a result of an American drone attack on Larak Island."
The Fars news agency reported "explosions heard near Larak Island in southern Iran."
Earlier today, the Mehr news agency quoted an Iranian source as saying that the Iranian armed forces had prevented 30 ships from crossing the Strait of Hormuz during the past week, for "violating the approved route and procedures for passage."
In contrast, the commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, confirmed last Friday that US forces had successfully removed naval mines planted months earlier by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard from international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz.
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