The dollar in Iraq is under siege... Washington scrutinizes Dubai transfers and halts shipments
Private and informed sources revealed developments they described as sensitive and dangerous in the Iraqi dollar file, indicating that the United States has begun, in the past few hours, to suddenly tighten the path of financial transfers leaving Iraq, especially those heading to Dubai, in a move that coincided with the suspension of dollar shipments to Iraq.
According to information obtained by Al-Mustaqilla, the American authorities have imposed strict scrutiny on financial transfers originating from Baghdad to the UAE, amid suspicions of mixing operations or transfers of unclear origin, which prompted Washington to tighten control urgently and directly.
The source confirmed that this sudden scrutiny is one of the main reasons behind the suspension of dollar shipments to Iraq in recent hours, reflecting growing American concern about the mechanisms for transferring funds out of the country and their final uses.
Available data indicates that current inspection procedures focus on tracking the movement of funds and ensuring the integrity of banking procedures related to foreign transfers, in light of increasing international pressure to tighten control over the Iraqi financial system and prevent any uses that may fall under illegal activities or raise suspicions among international regulatory bodies.
In contrast to these developments, no official clarification has yet been issued by the Iraqi government or the Central Bank of Iraq, which widens the circle of questions about the truth of what is happening, the size of the crisis, and its possible repercussions on the local market, especially since the dollar issue is one of the most sensitive issues in the Iraqi economy, given its direct link to the exchange rate, imports, and monetary stability.
Observers believe that the next phase may witness stricter measures on foreign transfers, and perhaps modifications to the dollar management mechanism within Iraq, if American pressure continues without reaching clear financial or diplomatic solutions to limit the escalation.
The Iraqi public, along with economic and financial circles, are awaiting an official position that reveals the truth about these developments, at a time when fears are growing about repercussions that may extend to exchange rates, markets and commercial activity, if the suspension of dollar shipments continues or restrictions imposed on foreign financial transfers expand.
Washington confirms that the suspension of dollar shipments to Iraq is "temporary".
The US State Department confirmed that Washington has temporarily suspended dollar shipments to Iraq. A State Department spokesperson, according to a statement carried by Kurdish media outlets, said, "The transfer of US dollars to Iraq has been temporarily halted." The spokesperson added, "The United States has temporarily suspended some security cooperation activities with Iraq, while continuing joint counterterrorism efforts that enhance US national security."
National Bank of Iraq accounts 2025: Profits on paper and a sharp decline in liquidity
High profits... but dwindling liquidity:
A review of the National Bank of Iraq's final accounts for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2025, reveals a striking financial paradox: high profits reported in the official statements, contrasted with a sharp decline in liquidity and a widening of several indicators that raise professional questions about the quality of growth, the nature of profitability, and the actual strength of the bank's financial position. This review was based on the consolidated financial statements and their accompanying notes and tables, focusing on the relationship between profitability, cash flows, credit expansion, provisions, deposits, intangible assets, and other sensitive accounts.
On the surface, the figures suggest the bank ended 2025 in a strong position, recording a profit of 308.5 billion Iraqi dinars for the year and a pre-tax profit of 357.7 billion dinars. However, this picture begins to change as soon as we turn to the cash flow statement, which reveals that cash and cash equivalents decreased by 273.4 billion dinars during the year, falling from approximately 1.537 trillion dinars at the beginning of the year to 1.263 trillion dinars at the end, while net cash flow from operating activities amounted to only 33.1 billion dinars. This discrepancy is the starting point for this investigation: how can the bank achieve profits of this magnitude while its liquidity declines so drastically?
High profits... and less cash flow
Accounting profit alone is insufficient to judge the quality of performance if it is not supported by consistent cash flows. In the case of the National Bank of Iraq, there appears to be a significant gap between reported profits and actual available cash. This does not necessarily indicate an accounting error, but it does raise legitimate questions about the nature of these profits: Are they the result of high-quality, readily convertible operating activity, or are they partly dependent on accounting constraints, non-cash revenues, or expansion that has consumed more liquidity than it has enhanced it?
A major leap in lending
One of the most striking findings of the reports is that total direct credit facilities rose to 2.911 trillion dinars at the end of 2025, compared to 1.878 trillion dinars at the end of 2024—an increase of over one trillion dinars in a single year. After deducting accrued interest and provisions for expected credit losses, net facilities reached 2.786 trillion dinars. While this might initially appear to indicate a successful expansion in credit activity, a more conservative professional perspective views this rapid growth as a development requiring deeper examination, rather than automatic celebration.
Healthy growth or a deferred risk?
The financial statements showed that non-performing loans reached 109.48 billion dinars, representing 3.76% of total loans, compared to 4.92% in the previous year. This might suggest a relative improvement in portfolio quality. However, this improvement cannot be considered conclusive without reservation, as a rapidly expanding loan portfolio could only superficially improve the ratio due to a larger denominator, rather than a genuine improvement in credit quality. Furthermore, very new loans are not quickly tested for actual default, meaning some risks are merely delayed rather than actually diminished.
Allocations under scrutiny
The provision for expected credit losses at the end of 2025 reached approximately 101.56 billion dinars, while the expenditure on provisions for impairment and expected credit losses during the year amounted to 30.88 billion dinars. These figures are not insignificant, but they require a more rigorous analysis when considered in light of the surge in loans by more than one trillion dinars in a single year. Provisions are not merely an accounting item; they are the primary line of defense against inflating profits and concealing deferred losses. The faster the credit growth, the more conservative the provisions must be, not less.
Commissions outweigh the benefits
One of the most striking points in the financial statements is that net commission income reached 297.06 billion dinars, exceeding net interest income of 227.68 billion dinars. This is significant because it indicates that the bank does not derive the majority of its profitability solely from traditional banking intermediation, but rather relies heavily on fees and commissions. This observation, in itself, does not necessarily indicate a problem, but it becomes more critical when considering the source of a significant portion of those commissions.
Currency window at the heart of profit
The financial statements indicate that the bank's purchases on behalf of clients through its currency window reached approximately US$17.828 billion by the end of 2025, generating commission revenues of 162.12 billion dinars. This reveals that the currency window's activity is not merely a margin of the bank's profitability, but a central component. This raises highly sensitive professional questions: To what extent does the bank's profitability depend on this activity? Will these revenues remain stable if the regulatory or supervisory environment changes? And do all transactions associated with this volume of purchases reflect genuine and transparent economic activity for the beneficiaries? The statements do not provide definitive answers, but they place this issue at the heart of supervisory scrutiny.
Deposits grow under the shadow of the public sector
Customer deposits reached approximately 3.971 trillion dinars at the end of 2025, compared to 3.463 trillion dinars in the previous year. The financial statements also showed that non-interest-bearing deposits amounted to 2.891 trillion dinars, representing 72.82% of total deposits—a comfortable percentage in terms of funding costs. However, behind this apparent improvement lies a point worth noting: Iraqi public sector deposits, specifically those of large corporations, reached 651.10 billion dinars, compared to only 259.12 billion dinars in the previous year. This significant jump raises a clear question: is the bank's deposit position based on a natural expansion of market confidence, or on a greater reliance on a general or quasi-general deposit base?
Risks of concentration in deposits
A thorough financial audit does not automatically consider public sector deposits a negative element, but neither does it treat them as a purely stabilizing factor. Large public sector deposits may enhance the bank's apparent financial position, but they also carry concentration risks and are more susceptible to change due to decisions or circumstances not directly related to the bank's day-to-day trading performance. This makes the growth of this item at this rate a point worthy of close monitoring, not just a cursory glance.
Fame and intangible assets
Intangible assets amounted to 192.29 billion dinars, of which 154.07 billion dinars was goodwill resulting from the acquisition of subsidiaries. Goodwill is not a tangible or monetary asset, but rather an estimated value that arises when a buyer pays a price higher than the net identifiable value of the acquired company's assets. The issue here is not the existence of goodwill itself, but its magnitude and the nature of the environment in which it was generated, particularly in a year marked by expansion, acquisitions, and the incorporation of new companies.
Have acquisitions increased the risks?
The higher the reputation, the more urgent the question becomes: Were the valuations of the acquired companies realistic and conservative? Were the impairment tests carried out rigorously? Does this reputation reflect real future economic benefits, or does it carry a degree of excessive accounting optimism? In acquisition years, the risks of misvaluation and burdening the balance sheet with intangible assets that may later require harsh tests are inherently higher.
Gray area in calculations
Other liabilities amounted to approximately 274.37 billion dinars. This category includes items such as outstanding accrued expenses, accounts receivable, payments due on investment accounts, amounts received for company registration, and other miscellaneous items. Other assets totaled 144.06 billion dinars, including assets acquired in settlement of debts, guarantees held by third parties, deductions, contributions to entities under formation, and other items. These items are among the most frequently interpreted with caution, as they can be natural entry points for adjustments and may also become gray areas for postponing settlements or carrying over the effects of transactions that have not yet been fully closed.
Apparent liquidity is not free
The financial statements show that cash reserves amounted to 888.55 billion dinars, while the cash flow statement reveals an increase in restricted withdrawal balances at the central bank by approximately 207.87 billion dinars. This indicates that a significant portion of cash or near-cash resources is not as readily available as the average reader might assume when reviewing the balance sheet. This highlights a crucial point of clarification: not everything that appears liquid on the balance sheet is actually readily available cash. The higher the number of restricted items, the greater the need to distinguish between apparent liquidity and actual available liquidity.
Summary of the investigation
After linking these indicators together, the National Bank of Iraq’s final accounts for 2025 do not appear to be just a story of high profits, but a more complex picture: strong profits met with a sharp cash decline, rapid credit growth surrounded by questions about quality, provisions that need more rigorous testing, a prominent reliance on commissions and the currency window, a large jump in public sector deposits, and an inflation of goodwill and intangible assets, along with an expansion in other accounts and liabilities under settlement.
This investigation does not lead to a final verdict or a definitive accusation, but at the same time, it does not provide the financial statements with a free pass. The question that arises after this analysis is not simply: Did the bank generate profits? But rather: What was the quality of these profits, how sustainable were they, and what risks might the financial statements have delayed or mitigated?
Direct press questions to the Central Bank: Have dollar shipments to Iraq been suspended?
Unofficial reports circulating in recent hours regarding the possibility of halting or reducing cash dollar shipments sent to Iraq have sparked a wave of questions in economic and financial circles, in the absence of an official clarification that settles the truth of this news or shows the nature of any possible changes in the mechanisms for supplying the local market with foreign currency.
At a time when the stability of the exchange market, cash liquidity and trade policies are largely linked to the flow of the dollar and its regulation mechanisms, there is a need for a clear position from the Central Bank of Iraq and its governor, clarifying to the public and market participants the reality of what is happening, and whether there are actual variables that may affect the exchange rate or the market’s ability to meet demand.
In this context, Al-Mustaqilla poses a series of direct journalistic questions that require official clarification from the Central Bank of Iraq:
First: Has the Central Bank of Iraq received any official or unofficial notification from the American side regarding the suspension or reduction of cash dollar shipments to Iraq?
Second: Have there been any changes to the mechanism for receiving cash dollars or to the approved channels for securing foreign currency for the Iraqi market?
Third: If this news is true, what is the expected impact on the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar, and how capable is the Central Bank of containing any potential market disruption?
Fourth: What procedures or alternatives does the central bank adopt to ensure the continued stability of the money market in the event of any interruption or reduction in the flow of cash dollars?
Fifth: Is there an actual trend at the Central Bank to reduce reliance on paper money and move more broadly to external transfer systems or alternative international settlements?
Sixth: What is the size of the cash reserve currently available, and is it sufficient to cover the needs of the local market in the event of a sudden disruption in the flow of foreign currency?
Seventh: How does the Central Bank assess the actual demand for dollars within the Iraqi market, and what is the impact of smuggling operations or illegal transfers on this demand?
Eighth: Is there direct and ongoing coordination with the US Treasury Department and relevant international bodies regarding import financing mechanisms and foreign trade transfers?
Ninth:
To what extent is the Iraqi banking sector affected by any potential international restrictions, sanctions, or measures that may impact the flow of dollars or external financing operations?
Tenth: Has the Central Bank prepared a clear contingency plan to deal with any sudden disruption in the flow of foreign currency, ensuring the protection of monetary stability and limiting the repercussions of this on prices and markets?
The Independent affirms that the importance of these questions stems from the sensitivity of the monetary file and its direct connection to financial and living stability in Iraq, which makes it necessary to provide clear and transparent official answers that spare the market further anxiety or interpretations, and present traders and the public with an accurate picture of what is happening.
An economist says Washington's policies in the region threaten the Iraqi economy.
Economic expert Rashid Al-Saadi confirmed on Friday that Iraq is incurring significant losses estimated at around $7 billion per month as a result of security tensions in the Strait of Hormuz region due to Washington's hostile policies towards the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Al-Saadi told Al-Maalomah News Agency that "these losses amount to more than $200 million per day," noting that "the disruption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz directly impacts Iraq's oil exports and global energy markets."
He added that "Iraq's reliance on oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz exceeds 90% of total exports, noting that the country exports about 3 million barrels per day through the strait, compared to about 1.5 million barrels through alternative ports and export lines towards Türkiye and Jordan."
Al-Saadi warned that "continued tensions in this vital waterway could negatively impact Iraq's financial revenues and affect the funding of salaries and service projects."
New sanctions package: Freezing accounts and terminating the residency permits of politicians and their families in America and Europe
Shiite leaders have received a copy of the expected measures, and some want to defy them!
Following the move to block the flow of dollars into Iraq, political analysts suggest that the next phase may witness a broader campaign targeting the "termination of residency permits" of Iraqis in Western countries suspected of having ties to Iran.
These developments come within the context of US punitive measures expected to later extend to include official institutions and banks within Iraq, after messages to this effect were delivered to a number of Shiite leaders in recent days.
According to circulating information, these messages were conveyed through a high-ranking US official, at a time when the Iraqi political scene is witnessing a clear scramble for the premiership.
In the same vein, a former member of parliament had previously predicted that the coming period would witness what he described as "significant" moves, expected to be led by a US official in the region, aimed at holding Iraqi officials accountable in the near future.
At the beginning of the week, indications emerged of parallel Iranian and American moves within Iraq, coinciding with the Shiite forces nearing the stage of deciding on the prime minister.
“The Residency Card” –
In this context, independent politician Mithal al-Alusi says the next measure might involve revoking the residency permits of Iraqis close to or supportive of Tehran, similar to what happened with relatives of Qassem Soleimani and Ali Larijani.
Speaking to Al-Mada, al-Alusi asserts that these measures will not be limited to the United States, but could extend to “Iraqis in Europe, Canada, and Australia, including politicians, their families, and their bank accounts.”
He adds, “This is the next American card,” warning that the current American silence does not mean turning a blind eye to corruption or armed factions, but could be a prelude to a sudden move similar to what happened in Iran previously, but at a faster pace within Iraq.
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal, citing Iraqi and American officials, revealed that the administration of US President Donald Trump has suspended dollar shipments to Iraq.
According to the report, the US Treasury Department has blocked the transfer of approximately $500 million in US currency, representing Iraqi oil revenues deposited in accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The newspaper also noted that Washington informed Baghdad of the suspension of funding for some counterterrorism and military training programs until attacks attributed to the factions cease and concrete steps are taken to dismantle armed groups.
In a significant development, the United States summoned the Iraqi ambassador earlier this month following a drone attack targeting a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad, part of a series of attacks that Washington blamed on "Iranian-backed militias."
In a related context, Al-Alousi, in a report published by Al-Mada last week, conveyed his expectations that the next phase will witness clear American moves after the conclusion of the Iranian issue, whether towards escalation or de-escalation, with the aim of pursuing those he described as "plunderers of Iraq's wealth" and those involved in "killing innocents, stealing the political process, and abusing democracy."
He indicates that what he termed "the movements of Tom Barrack," the US envoy to Iraq, may be a prelude to significant upcoming changes in the Iraqi landscape, without specifying their nature or timing.
Government formation under pressure
Alongside this escalation, there is a belief within the "Coordination Framework" that the meeting scheduled to take place during the preparation of this report could be decisive in choosing the prime minister. This meeting is to be held at the home of Humam Hamoudi, leader of the Supreme Council, after four previous rounds of talks failed to produce results.
According to a Shiite politician familiar with the negotiations, US envoy Tom Barrack had conveyed similar messages regarding sanctions, coinciding with demands from the US State Department for the immediate "dismantling of militias."
The politician, who requested anonymity, told Al-Mada that some within the "Coordination Framework" are pushing to ignore US pressure, especially after the visit of Iranian official Ismail Qaani to Baghdad a few days prior. Although the content of his messages was not fully clear, they were described as "messages of defiance."
The source points to what he considers "miscalculations" within the Framework, embodied in the insistence on nominating Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister, despite the US position rejecting him, which President Donald Trump described as "a bad choice."
It also reveals warnings of potential sanctions against more than 60 banks, vital institutions, and security agencies within Iraq.
Despite the passage of approximately 170 days since the general elections, the "Coordination Framework" remains unable to resolve its position on whether to endorse Maliki or replace him.
Prior to the anticipated decisive session, demands emerged within the "Framework" to involve the full assembly or to allow for a vote based on the weight of individual members, following the tie among the framework's leaders.
According to an advisor to Maliki, the team supporting caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has lost hope of securing the required two-thirds majority of the 12 leaders' votes. This has prompted some parties, including the bloc of Ammar al-Hakim and Qais al-Khazali, to propose a vote by the full assembly, which comprises more than 180 members.
However, this proposal was rejected by the "State of Law Coalition," which insists on limiting the vote to the 12 leaders within the framework.
In the same vein, Qusay Mahbouba, a member of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, proposed resorting to a secret ballot within the General Assembly (comprising approximately 180 Shiite members of parliament) to select the prime minister.
Within the Shiite political landscape, three scenarios are circulating: a tie between al-Sudani and al-Maliki; a tie between al-Sudani and Basim al-Badri after al-Maliki's withdrawal; or a tie between both al-Sudani and Basim al-Badri, with the competition then shifting to Basim al-Badri and Ihsan al-Awadi, head of al-Sudani's office and a former member of the Dawa Party.
Alongside the nomination crisis, a member of parliament from the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, revealed that the dispute has entered a new phase concerning the distribution of ministerial portfolios, following the completion of the initial selection process.
Zahraa Luqman indicated that political forces are now negotiating the allocation of portfolios after finalizing the candidates, reflecting the crisis's shift from the nomination stage to a power-sharing arrangement.
Diplomatic reading: The failure of balance
. Former diplomat Ghazi Faisal told Al-Mada that successive Iraqi governments have failed to achieve an actual balance between the United States and Iran, despite the existence of a strategic agreement signed in 2008.
He adds that this failure stems from "political miscalculation," at a time when, in his view, Baghdad is not committed to curbing the armed groups, whose fighters are estimated at around 250,000, and which operate under the influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force.
Faisal speaks of more than 570 armed attacks on Kurdistan, in addition to attacks on Baghdad Airport, military bases, and security headquarters, considering these factions to be acting as "a state within a state."
He believes that some of these attacks have extended beyond Iraq, targeting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reflecting—in his words—Iraq's transformation into an arena for proxy conflicts.
Faisal also places some of the responsibility on the political forces that contributed to the emergence of these factions, under a broad interpretation of the "sufficient jihad" fatwa issued by the religious authority. Faisal, who heads the Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies, goes even further, stating that these factions "did not emerge from a vacuum." Rather, they were formed, established, and supported—as he puts it—by leaders within the coordinating framework, in coordination with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Iran.
He also links this to the rise of ISIS in Mosul, arguing that some of these groups exploited that period to reconstitute themselves, despite their contradiction—in his view—with the fatwa of "sufficient jihad" issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This fatwa called for volunteering within the armed forces to confront ISIS, not for the formation of permanent armed entities outside the framework of the state. He asserts that what occurred was the establishment of "factions with a distinct character," modeled after Hezbollah or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which, he says, led to the creation of a parallel system to the official military establishment. He adds that this situation prompted the United States to take financial measures, including freezing approximately $500 million, fearing—as he says—that some of it might be diverted to Iran and armed factions. This, he argues, contradicts the US strategy, which is supposedly aimed at supporting stability in Iraq, not funding armed groups within it. In his assessment of the situation, Faisal presents two contradictory options for Iraq: either sliding into complete alignment with Iran against the United States and the West, or adhering to the strategic agreement with Washington within a clear partnership framework. He concludes that the next prime minister—in his estimation—will not significantly alter the existing equation. He will remain, as he puts it, a "director-general" with limited constitutional powers, unable to make strategic decisions or dismantle existing armed structures, given the absence of any concrete action thus far
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Trump: Iran intends to present an offer that meets US demands.
US President Donald Trump announced that "Iran intends to present an offer that meets US demands."
In statements carried by international media outlets on Friday, he said, "Iran wants to hold talks and explore the possibility of reaching an agreement."
He added, "The officials negotiating with Iran are dealing with people who are in charge in Tehran.
US State Department: Sending dollars to Iraq was temporarily suspended
The US State Department spokesperson confirmed that Washington has temporarily suspended dollar shipments to Iraq, while emphasizing the continuation of counterterrorism cooperation.
The spokesperson explained in a press statement: "We can confirm that the transfer of US dollars to Iraq has been temporarily halted."
He added, "The United States has temporarily suspended some security cooperation activities with Iraq, but joint counterterrorism efforts, which enhance US national security, continue."
The Emir of Qatar and the US President discuss the latest developments in the ceasefire agreement.
The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and US President Donald Trump discussed the latest developments regarding the ceasefire agreement between Washington and Tehran on Friday.
The Qatari Amiri Diwan stated that "the Emir of the State of Qatar received a call from President Trump, during which they discussed the latest regional developments."
It added that "the Emir of the State of Qatar discussed with President Trump the repercussions of the situation on maritime security and global supply chains."
The statement continued, "During the call with Trump, the Emir stressed the need to reduce tensions and support peaceful solutions."
Sudanese advisor reveals two paths to enhance economic stability: food security is guaranteed.
On Friday, Mazhar Muhammad Salih, the economic advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, affirmed that the level of food security in the country remains within a safe range, pointing to two main trends that contribute to strengthening overall economic stability and providing a level of reassurance in conducting daily economic life.
Saleh explained to Shafaq News Agency that "the first trend is the continuation of the policy of broad government support for prices, especially in the basic paragraphs that are governing in the current fiscal policy."
According to Saleh, this support includes "the food basket and strategic food stocks, in addition to support for medicine and the agricultural sector, especially grain production."
He pointed out that "support also extends to fuel, social, economic and health services, without interruption," noting that "official indicators issued by the Ministry of Trade confirm that the level of food security in the country is still within a safe range, which enhances the stability of domestic markets."
He explained that "the second trend relates to the status of foreign reserves, which remain at stable levels and are sufficient to cover the external financing needs of trade for a period exceeding one year."
According to the government advisor, "This stability is based on oil export revenues, which are the country's main source of foreign currency."
He added that "the value of foreign reserves is estimated at about $100 billion, which provides a relative margin of safety in managing external obligations and supports the stability of the exchange rate."
Regarding external challenges, Saleh noted that "this stability comes amid delicate regional and international circumstances, with escalating concerns about geopolitical tensions, particularly those related to the potential disruption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, which is one of the most vital waterways for global oil trade," suggesting that these tensions will have a limited impact in the medium term.
He stressed that "monetary management plays a pivotal role in achieving a balance between providing liquidity and maintaining price stability, as well as meeting the market's need for foreign currency," noting that "this balanced policy represents an essential tool for containing inflationary pressures."
Saleh added that "these measures contribute to maintaining relative stability in the national economy, despite regional challenges, until tensions subside and conditions return to normal."
The war that broke out on February 28, 2026, between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other, caused an almost complete paralysis of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the passage through which about 4.5% of total annual global trade passes, leading to a decline in navigation to very low levels.
As a result of the disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Iraqi oil production has fallen sharply from 4.3 million barrels per day to 1.3 million barrels per day.
This decline has led to Iraqi exports falling to less than 800,000 barrels per day, and a loss of $128 million per day after oil production stopped, according to the "Eco Iraq" observatory.
Around 20 million barrels of oil pass through this strategic strait daily, and its closure has caused an increase in shipping and insurance costs and a rise in oil prices, raising fears of global economic repercussions.
A recent study published in the international journal Nature Food on April 16 showed that Iraq is among six countries unable to meet their food needs locally, amid a global gap in achieving self-sufficiency.
The study showed that achieving food security is not limited to the production of calories, but requires an integrated system that includes seven main categories: basic grains, fruits, vegetables, dairy products, meat, fish, and legumes.
She stressed that economic wealth does not guarantee food security, as many rich countries rely on imports to meet their needs, given the challenges of local production and natural resources.
Framework delayed PM decision to await US-Iran talks outcome, politician says
Leaders of the Coordination Framework postponed naming a prime minister candidate at a recent meeting in order to await the outcome of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, a politician familiar with the discussions has said.
“The apparent reason was the dispute over the two-thirds mechanism, but the underlying reason was waiting for the U.S.-Iran negotiations and what they will lead to,” Aziz al-Rubaie, secretary-general of the National Line Movement, said in a televised interview.
Rubaie said the meeting, held at the home of Hikma Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim, included Accountability and Justice Commission head Basim al-Badri waiting in a nearby room with a political vision prepared in the event he was named as a candidate. Leaders decided at the last moment to delay the announcement, he said.
Rubaie predicted the framework would not reach conclusions at its Friday meeting either, adding that Sudani and others may yet propose former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi as a compromise candidate. He attributed the deadlock to “stubbornness and narcissism” among political leaders and said reliance on external actors had distorted decision-making. “We have reached a point where we wait for a signal from the Americans or approval from the Iranians to choose the prime minister,” he said.
The Coordination Framework’s nomination of Maliki in January drew direct U.S. opposition, with Trump warning Washington could halt support for Iraq if Maliki returned to power. The Dawa Party has maintained his candidacy “has not been withdrawn,” while rival factions say eight blocs back incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani against four for Maliki. Badri and Ihsan al-Awadi, director of Sudani’s office, remain under consideration as alternatives.
President Nizar Amedi has 15 days from his April 12 inauguration under Article 76 to task the largest bloc’s nominee with forming a government.
CNN: Washington plans to send Whitkopf and Kushner to Pakistan to meet with Araqchi
CNN quoted officials in the administration of US President Donald Trump on Friday (April 24, 2026) as saying that the White House intends to send envoys Steve Wittkopf and Jared Kushner to Pakistan to participate in talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, as part of diplomatic efforts to discuss developments in the regional file.
According to the network, "President Trump intends to send Wittkopf and Kushner to Pakistan to participate in talks with Araqchi."
She added that "Vance is not currently planning to attend the talks in Pakistan due to Qalibaf's absence."
She added that "Vance is ready to travel to Islamabad if progress is made in the talks."
Araghchi had confirmed via the “X” platform that neighboring countries represent a “priority” in his country’s diplomatic moves.
Iranian and Pakistani media reported on Friday that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi would arrive in Islamabad that day for talks, with the announcement of a new round of negotiations between Tehran and Washington being likely.
The Pakistani capital, Islamabad, was scheduled to host a new round of negotiations between the American and Iranian delegations in recent days, but those talks failed due to escalation by both sides.
Iran accused the United States of violating the ceasefire by continuing the blockade on its ports, while Washington insists it will not lift the blockade before reaching a framework agreement with the Iranian side.
Araghchi announces upcoming tour to Islamabad, Muscat and Moscow
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said on Friday (April 24, 2026) that he will begin a tour "at an important time" that includes Islamabad, Muscat and Moscow, with the aim of coordinating positions closely with partners on bilateral issues, and consulting on regional developments.
Araghchi confirmed via the "X" platform that neighboring countries represent a "priority" in his country's diplomatic moves.
Iranian and Pakistani media reported on Friday that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi would arrive in Islamabad that day for talks, with the announcement of a new round of negotiations between Tehran and Washington being likely.
The Pakistani capital, Islamabad, was scheduled to host a new round of negotiations between the American and Iranian delegations in recent days, but those talks failed due to escalation by both sides.
Iran accused the United States of violating the ceasefire by continuing the blockade on its ports, while Washington insists it will not lift the blockade before reaching a framework agreement with the Iranian side.
Kujer: No impact on salaries, but potential repercussions for the budget and investment.
Kujer told Al-Furat News Agency that “if the funds for Iraq do not reach through the US Federal Reserve, there will be no impact on salaries because it will not last long,” explaining that “the impact may affect operational materials related to the budget, as well as the strength of the Iraqi currency, the capital present in the country, and the investment aspect.”
He added, "This is very far off, because the American side decided in 2023 to adopt regulatory procedures for Iraq to enter its system through the (SWIFT) application," stressing that "what is being circulated regarding the withholding of Iraq's funds is contrary to the approved system."
Al-Mashhadani: There are no concerns about employee salaries, and the government is committed to ensuring them.
Al-Mashhadani told Al-Furat News Agency that "there is no concern about the salaries of employees, because this is a governmental matter," indicating that "the government presented the loan project from the Central Bank as an easier solution."
He added, "The government secures salaries by any means necessary, as it is one of its primary responsibilities."
Expected decision today: Al-Sudani is the most likely candidate for prime minister after the chances
of Al-Maliki's candidate diminished.
All eyes are on Saturday for a crucial meeting of the Coordination Framework forces, which is expected to end the debate over the name of the next prime minister, after postponing the decision that was scheduled for Friday, amid rapid developments in the positions of the political forces.
Well-informed political sources confirmed that the balance of power within the framework has clearly shifted in favor of the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, after the leader of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, realized the difficulty of passing his alternative candidate in light of the decline in political support for him.
According to the sources, the ball is back in Sudani’s court, who has become the most likely candidate to receive the official mandate to form the new government, in light of growing consensus within the Shiite forces.
The information indicated that Maliki showed some flexibility in his position during the last few hours, with indications that he would move towards supporting the consensus of the framework forces on assigning Al-Sudani, in order to avoid further political division.
Today’s meeting is expected to produce a decisive announcement regarding the appointment of the prime minister, in a move that could pave the way for a new political phase characterized by consensus and an attempt to contain the disputes within the Shiite political establishment.
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The IMF just issued a warning about Iraq
