The Iranian parliament approves removing four zeros from the currency.
MP Fathallah Tavasoli, a member of the Iranian parliament's economic committee, announced the committee's approval of a bill to remove four zeros from the national currency.
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Tosoli explained that this project, submitted by the government, was approved after addressing the comments and in agreement with the governor of the Central Bank, the Ministry of Economy, and the relevant committee.
The Economic Committee stated that this step aims to facilitate transactions, and that the project's details are currently being amended to comply with other laws.
In May, the governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Mohammad Reza Farzin, stated that removing four zeros from the national currency "represents a priority in the country's monetary reform plan for the current year 2025."
Removing zeros from a currency is a financial procedure in which the circulating currency is replaced by a new one with a reduced nominal value, with specific zeros removed from its denominations (for example, when six zeros are removed, every million units of the old currency become equivalent to one unit of the modified currency).
This measure is usually taken to enhance financial credibility, restore monetary confidence, regulate exchange markets, and combat inflation.
Is your balance at risk? Government bank funds between state control and citizens' concerns.
Amid growing questions about the Ministry of Finance's authority to manage cash resources within the government banking system, there is a need to redefine the nature of funds held at Rafidain and Rashid banks. Are these funds considered public funds subject to state jurisdiction, or do they fall under the ownership of individuals and depositors? This question re-emerges as a legal and conceptual ambiguity that has long characterized the relationship between public funds and official banks, opening the door to divergent interpretations, some of which lack a constitutional or financial basis, according to experts.
In light of this data, economic expert Karim Al-Helou confirmed today, Wednesday (July 30, 2025), that the funds in the Rafidain and Rashid banks belong to the state, and are not citizens’ money, as is being promoted.
Al-Helou told Baghdad Today, "The funds held within Rafidain Bank and Rashid Bank are government funds, and do not belong to citizens, as some claim." He explained that "the Ministry of Finance has full authority to move or circulate them between banks and various government institutions as needed, and they are not considered private depositors' funds."
He added, "The allegations about citizens being unable to withdraw their money from these banks are not based on facts, as there has not been a single documented case of a person visiting a bank to withdraw their money and being prevented from doing so." He noted that "this claim is inaccurate and exaggerated."
Al-Helou continued, "What is happening has absolutely nothing to do with stealing depositors' money or violating their rights. Rather, it relates to the regulation and management of liquidity by the Ministry of Finance, a routine procedure that falls within its legal and administrative powers."
He pointed out that "most citizens' money is not even deposited in banks, but is kept in homes and used for direct buying and selling," noting that "an estimated 95 trillion Iraqi dinars are currently circulating among people outside the banking system."
Al-Halou concluded his remarks by explaining that "the total money supply printed by the state ranges between 125 and 135 trillion Iraqi dinars, reflecting the amount of liquidity available in the market and households."
Some researchers note that the importance of this clarification stems from the fact that government banks, as executive instruments of the state's financial policies, are not treated in the same manner as commercial banks. The funds deposited in them are mostly allocated to cover public spending requirements and the state's internal transactions, making them part of the sovereign system rather than part of the citizen's private funds.
However, the lack of a precise understanding of this function has led to the spread of inaccurate perceptions linking the movement of these funds to individuals' financial rights. This requires a clear awareness-raising discourse that recalibrates the conceptual distinctions between public funds and individual property in the Iraqi banking context.
The most prominent Iraqi banks that have maintained their asset size since the beginning of the year.
Despite the variance in the performance of some banks, Iraqi private banks have maintained their leading position as the largest banks in terms of asset size.
Together, they account for approximately 50% of the total assets of private banks and 8% of the total assets of the Iraqi banking sector.
International Development Bank - 3.1 trillion dinars
Iraqi Islamic Bank - 2.77 trillion dinars
BankAl-Mansour- 2 trillion Iraqi dinars
. Both the International Development Bank and the Iraqi Islamic Bank witnessed growth in the size of their assets during the first half of 2025, while the Bank recordedBaghdadand Mansour Bank witnessed a decline in their assets.
Regarding credit performance:
Private Iraqi banks recorded a credit portfolio exceeding one trillion dinars, reflecting their strong financing capacity:
International Development Bank: 1.12 trillion dinars
Iraqi Islamic Bank: 1 trillion dinars
In contrast, the credit portfolio of each of:
Mansour Bank: 242 billion dinars
Bank of Baghdad: 91 billion dinars only
public deposits
, and the banks were able to attract deposits exceeding 2 trillion dinars each, namely:
International Development Bank: 2.3 trillion dinars
Bank of Baghdad: 2.2 trillion dinars
As for public deposits in the remaining banks, they were as follows:
Mansour Bank: 1.23 trillion dinars
Iraqi Islamic Bank: 743 billion dinars
As for the money supply in banks:
Mansour Bank: 1.47 trillion dinars
Bank of Baghdad: 1.43 trillion dinars
International Development Bank: 1.3 trillion dinars
Iraqi Islamic Bank: 1.3 trillion dinars
The above banks are considered leaders in the private banking sector in terms of the services they provide, the spread of their branches, and the level of services they provide
Why aren't prices falling? An expert reveals traders' concerns despite the dollar's decline.
Al-Mashhadani told Furat News that: “Traders are still not reassured by the current decline, which is why they are maintaining their prices,” indicating that “the relationship between the decline in the exchange rate and commodity prices is “direct, while the increase is inverse.”
He pointed out that “traders are obsessed with the current decline. If the exchange rate increases, they will raise prices on the same day, and the increase will be higher than the previous price.”
Al-Mashhadani stressed that “despite the decline in the exchange rate, traders are continuing to conduct business at a rate of 150 dinars to the dollar due to their lack of confidence in the stability of the situation.”
Central Bank of Iraq: Decrease in public spending and stability in domestic debt
The Central Bank of Iraq revealed on Wednesday a decline in public spending and a stabilization of domestic debt in April 2025.
The bank indicated in a report reviewed by Shafaq News Agency that the state's public spending in April amounted to 9.49 trillion dinars, registering a 6.69% decrease compared to March, which amounted to 10.17 trillion dinars. Spending also decreased compared to the same period in 2024, which recorded 12.07 trillion dinars.
The report indicated that domestic public debt stabilized at 58.54 trillion dinars in April, the same level recorded in March, but an 11.13% increase compared to the same period in 2024, when it reached 76.97 trillion dinars.
Al-Sudani: It is time for our people to feel the services in all regions.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani affirmed, today, Wednesday (July 30, 2025), that the collective effort made by the government contributed to producing tangible work effort for citizens, noting that "it is time for our people to feel the services in all regions."
The Prime Minister's media office said in a statement received by Baghdad Today that "Al-Sudani launched, today, Wednesday, the executive works of the Al-Krayat Bridge project on the Tigris River, as part of the campaign to rebuild the holy city of Kadhimiya, which is the first development project in the (Fifth Division) area, which aims to open the military zone closed for decades, and allocate its lands to establish service facilities, cultural and religious centers, and multiple rest cities for visitors."
Al-Sudani, according to the statement, praised the efforts of the executive team, which included ministers, the Director of the Prime Minister's Office, officials and technicians, the Ministry of Housing, the Baghdad Municipality, the Investment Commission, the Kadhimiya Shrine, and the Hanafi Shrine, as the collective effort produced a tangible reality for the citizen. He pointed to the government's realistic, planning, and comprehensive vision for the service sector, which took into account the specificities of each district, city, and sub-district.
The Prime Minister also announced the Fifth Division area, with an area of 400 dunums, as an investment opportunity for all companies, stressing that it will be announced in a transparent and clear manner, and that it will not contain any residential project, in addition to its distinguished strategic location, close to the shrine of the two Imams Al-Kadhimiya (peace be upon them), where a museum will be built with an area of 12,500 square meters, to be a witness to the dark dictatorial era, and the practice of the most heinous violations, and the museum is a guarantee that tragedies will not be repeated, as citizens will see the ugliness of that era.
Al-Sudani said, "Baghdad's population exceeds 9.5 million, and the capital hasn't seen any rehabilitation projects commensurate with its capacity or a distinct identity to address the problems it faces." He explained that, "Kadhimiya hasn't received any attention for decades, but today it's witnessing a qualitative shift that takes into account its Islamic identity and the number of visitors, and ensures smooth flow of traffic during special occasions."
He pointed out that "the programs and plans of 'Baghdad More Beautiful 1 and 2' and the plans of the ministries and the Baghdad Municipality all aim to pursue comprehensive and integrated rehabilitation, emphasizing the government's commitment to Islamic architectural standards in the projects planned for this area."
He added, "The reconstruction campaign includes shops and neighborhoods in Kadhimiya, across all sectors, schools, and other service institutions. He emphasized the need to adhere to accuracy, inventory, and specifications in accordance with the plan, and to work with high quality and speedy implementation."
The Al-Krayat Bridge project is a vital component of the second package of traffic congestion relief projects. It will also include the construction of numerous service facilities and approaches, including passageways and axes connecting it to the Mohammed Al-Qasim Expressway and the Army Canal.
The campaign to rebuild the holy city of Kadhimiya continues, which includes the rehabilitation and expansion of (15) main streets for five neighborhoods, the establishment of (38) schools, the restoration of (4) heritage schools, the cladding and paving of (12) residential neighborhoods, the development of garages, the construction of bridges, in addition to the establishment of recreational areas for families. The campaign also includes the construction of six entrances to the city, the rehabilitation of the sewage station, the provision of services to agricultural areas, the rehabilitation of the city water project, the Fattah Pasha Street Boulevard, and other projects, in addition to the transfer of the headquarters of official departments outside the city.
bullet points of speech kind of
the speech points they put out
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani launched the implementation works of the Al-Krayat Bridge project on the Tigris River today, Wednesday, as part of the campaign to rebuild the holy city of Kadhimiya. This project is the first development project in the (Fifth Division) area, which aims to open the military zone that has been closed for decades, and allocate its lands for the establishment of service facilities, cultural and religious centers, and multiple rest cities for visitors.
Mr. Al-Sudani commended the efforts of the executive team, comprising ministers, the Director of the Prime Minister's Office, officials and technicians, the Ministry of Housing, the Baghdad Municipality, the Investment Commission, the Kadhimiya Shrine, and the Hanafi Shrine, as the collective effort produced a tangible reality for citizens. He pointed to the government's realistic, planning, and comprehensive vision for the service sector, which took into account the specificities of each district, city, and sub-district.
The Prime Minister also announced the Fifth Division area, with an area of 400 dunums, as an investment opportunity for all companies, stressing that it will be announced in a transparent and clear manner, and that it will not contain any residential project, in addition to its distinguished strategic location, close to the shrine of the two Imams Al-Kadhimiya (peace be upon them), where a museum will be built with an area of 12,500 square meters, to be a witness to the dark dictatorial era, and the practice of the most heinous violations, and the museum is a guarantee that tragedies will not be repeated, as citizens will see the ugliness of that era.
The following are the highlights of the Prime Minister's speech:
Baghdad's population exceeds 9.5 million, yet the capital has not witnessed rehabilitation projects commensurate with its capacity or a distinct identity to address the problems it faces.
Al-Kadhimiya has received little attention for decades. Today, it is witnessing a qualitative shift that takes into account its Islamic character, the number of visitors, and the smooth flow of traffic during special occasions.
The programs and plans (Baghdad More Beautiful 1 and 2) and the plans of the ministries and the Baghdad Municipality, all aimed at proceeding with comprehensive and integrated rehabilitation.
We have been keen to adhere to Islamic architectural standards in the projects planned for this area.
The reconstruction campaign includes shops and neighborhoods in Kadhimiya, across all sectors, schools, and other service institutions.
We emphasize our commitment to accuracy, inspections, and specifications according to the plan, and to high-quality work with speedy implementation.
The Al-Krayat Bridge project is a vital component of the second package of traffic congestion relief projects. It will also include the construction of numerous service facilities and approaches, including passageways and axes connecting it to the Mohammed Al-Qasim Expressway and the Army Canal.
The campaign to rebuild the holy city of Kadhimiya continues, which includes the rehabilitation and expansion of (15) main streets for five neighborhoods, the establishment of (38) schools, the restoration of (4) heritage schools, the cladding and paving of (12) residential neighborhoods, the development of garages, the construction of bridges, in addition to the establishment of recreational areas for families. The campaign also includes the construction of six entrances to the city, the rehabilitation of the sewage station, the provision of services to agricultural areas, the rehabilitation of the city water project, the Fattah Pasha Street Boulevard, and other projects, in addition to the transfer of the headquarters of official departments outside the city.
The Ministry of Finance signs an agreement with an Iraqi bank to activate the sovereign guarantees program.
he National Bank of Iraq signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Finance aimed at activating the sovereign guarantees program. This step reflects the Iraqi government's commitment to empowering the banking sector, enhancing its role in supporting the national economy, and stimulating investment in priority projects.
This agreement aims to enable Iraqi banks to contribute to providing long-term credit facilities for national projects, through guarantees provided in part by the Iraqi government to foreign international financing institutions. This will help reduce financing risks and encourage the private sector and local and international investors to enter the Iraqi market with greater confidence.
Under the agreement, the National Bank of Iraq will facilitate financial relations for projects and assist in obtaining financing through international financial institutions, in line with its support for productive sectors, particularly industries that receive direct attention from the Iraqi government.
This agreement comes as part of the government's efforts to strengthen public-private partnerships and enable local banks to play a greater role in supporting the national economy, particularly in vital sectors such as industry, energy, and housing.
This step is in line with the Iraqi government's financial and administrative reform plan, which aims to diversify sources of income, boost non-oil revenues, and enable the banking sector to play a greater role in supporting sustainable development and achieving the national economic vision.
A state-owned bank announces the settlement of 87% of Iraq's external debt.
Rafidain Bank announced on Wednesday that it had achieved "substantial" progress on its foreign debt portfolio, settling approximately 87% of total international obligations through high-level financial and legal negotiations, resulting in a significant reduction in the volume of foreign debt.
The bank said in a statement today, "In the context of Iraq's commitment to the Paris Club Agreement, and with the direct approval of the Council of Ministers, the bank concluded major negotiated settlements with Dutch and French creditor companies, the most prominent of which was: Cabinet Resolution No. (403) of 2025: Settlement of three lawsuits filed by Dutch companies with a concession rate in favor of the bank exceeding 90% of the value of those claims.
The statement explained that "the bank has achieved significant legal successes abroad, most notably winning lawsuits in Turkey and Lebanon, enabling it to recover more than $2.8 million, reflecting the competence of its legal apparatus and its ability to defend the state's rights before international courts."
The bank affirmed in its statement that it "continues its efforts to close the remaining issues through final settlements, which will strengthen Iraq's sovereign rating and consolidate international confidence in its financial stability and commitment to sound financial governance."
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Al-Harki: The oil agreement between Baghdad and Erbil is a step towards enacting the oil and gas law.
A leader in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Ahmed Al-Harki, considered on Wednesday that the recent agreement between the federal government and the regional government is a positive interim step, but it constitutes a real beginning to strengthen trust between the two sides, and paves the way for the approval of the oil and gas law that has been postponed for nearly two decades.
Al-Harki said in a statement to Al-Maalouma, “The oil and gas issue between Baghdad and Erbil is moving toward a solution, especially after reaching the interim agreement, which is a real beginning to restore trust between the two parties.”
He added, "Although the agreement is interim, it will open the door to strategic solutions and lead to a final agreement on regulating the oil file, which enhances the chances of approving the oil and gas law during the first session of the next parliament."
It is noteworthy that Baghdad and Erbil announced last Thursday that they had reached an understanding on the export of the region's oil, which paves the way for the resumption of exports through the SOMO company after a hiatus of more than two years.
Al-Sudani visits Al-Maliki to check on his health.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani visited the head of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, on Wednesday to check on his health.
Maliki's media office said in a statement, "The head of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, received Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani this evening."
The statement added that "the visit comes to check on the health of the head of the State of Law Coalition after the medical tests he underwent yesterday, Tuesday."
According to the statement, al-Sudani expressed "his sincere wishes for continued health and wellness for al-Maliki," praising "his national contributions and his role in consolidating political stability in the country."
For his part, al-Maliki appreciated the fraternal visit, expressing his "thanks to everyone who contacted him and expressed their kind feelings."
Key Card and Baha Abdul-Hussein on Washington's sanctions list
Informed sources told Al-Mustaqilla that US authorities have begun formal steps to place the "Ki Card" company and its director, Bahaa Abdul Hussein, on the economic sanctions list, accusing them of committing violations related to corruption and money laundering.
These measures are part of Washington's ongoing efforts to combat financial corruption and enhance transparency in economic transactions, particularly in regions where electronic payment companies and digital financial services are increasingly active.
K-Card, a leading provider of electronic payment services in Iraq, is facing accusations of exploiting its market position to engage in dubious financial activities, including money laundering and illegal transfers, according to the same sources.
These developments have raised widespread questions within Iraqi economic circles about the extent to which US sanctions will impact the country's electronic payments sector, an emerging and important sector supporting the digital economy.
For its part, Qi Card and its CEO have yet to issue any official statements in response to these accusations. Markets and observers expect this US move to lead to tighter oversight of financial companies operating in Iraq, and possibly more stringent enforcement of anti-corruption and financial crime mechanisms.
It's worth noting that the United States uses economic sanctions as a tool of pressure against individuals and companies involved in illegal activities, with the aim of limiting their negative impact on the global economy and promoting integrity in financial transactions.
Iraq to Negotiate Tax Agreements with China, Qatar, and Czech Republic
As part of its external relations and financial coordination strategy, Iraq's Cabinet has authorised the Minister of Finance, or a delegated representative, to negotiate and sign draft agreements aimed at avoiding double taxation and preventing tax evasion with China, Qatar, and the Czech Republic.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will prepare the required authorisation documents on behalf of the Republic of Iraq and submit them for the Prime Minister's signature.
Iraq deposits 2.644 trillion dinars into the special account for the Chinese agreement.
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5 years and 2.6 trillion dinars: The Chinese agreement is under question
Although more than five years have passed since the implementation of the Iraqi-Chinese agreement, known as the "oil for reconstruction" principle, its controversy remains strongly present in economic and political circles. Various interpretations of its feasibility exist, with some viewing it as a strategic project to free Iraq from economic dependence on the West, while others consider it yet another example of opaque contracts devoid of accountability and serious implementation.
In the context of monitoring the financial performance of the agreement, economic expert Nabil Al-Marsoumi revealed in a post on his official Facebook page, followed by Baghdad Today, that Iraq has raised the ceiling of its oil contribution to the agreement to the equivalent of 150,000 barrels per day, and that the revenues deposited in the special account amounted to 2.644 trillion dinars during the first five months of 2025. These figures, despite their importance, can only be understood within a broader context that re-sheds light on the background of the agreement, its implementation problems, and its geopolitical repercussions, especially in light of the undeclared tension it has caused in the relationship with the United States.
Signing the agreement
The Iraq-China agreement was first signed in May 2018 as part of a cooperation framework agreement between the two countries, before entering into actual implementation in September 2019 during then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi's visit to Beijing. The agreement stipulated that Iraq allocate an initial quantity of 100,000 barrels per day from its oil exports, the proceeds of which would be deposited into a special account managed jointly by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. This account would be used to finance development projects implemented by Chinese state-owned companies.
The signing of the agreement took place amid a sensitive political context, marked by a clear cooling in Iraqi-American relations and a rise in Chinese influence in the Middle East. In this context, the agreement was interpreted as an attempt to expand Iraq's margin of maneuver beyond American influence, which sparked escalating American reservations, which later manifested as undeclared pressure to freeze or curtail implementation of the agreement, according to observers.
The agreement's structure and implementation mechanism:
The agreement consists of several financial and technical elements, the most prominent of which are:
Iraqi oil exports to China amounted to 100,000 barrels per day, later increased to 150,000 barrels.
Export revenues were deposited into a "settlement account" under joint Iraqi-Chinese supervision.
Ten percent of monthly revenues were allocated to finance infrastructure projects, selected by the Iraqi government and implemented by Chinese companies.
A Chinese credit line, guaranteed by the Chinese insurance company Sinosure, could be opened, amounting to up to $10 billion, to expedite the implementation of major projects.
Despite this flexible structure, actual implementation remained limited. By 2025, only one major project had been launched under this framework—the construction of 1,000 schools—amid a conspicuous absence of major strategic projects in the electricity, transportation, or health sectors.
Criticisms of the agreement
According to economic experts familiar with the details, the China-Iraq agreement has been accompanied by a series of structural criticisms since its announcement, targeting its formulation, implementation mechanisms, and subsequent outcomes. Perhaps the most significant of these problems was the lack of institutional transparency. The full text of the agreement was not published, nor were its details presented to parliament or subject to public debate. This contributed to creating a gap between the government, on the one hand, and public opinion and oversight institutions, on the other. This ambiguity undermined confidence in the project and raised serious questions about the contracting mechanisms and selection criteria for the implementing companies.
In addition, there has been sharp criticism of what has been deemed a "mortgage to national resources" within unbalanced mechanisms. The agreement essentially involves Iraq using its own oil revenues to finance projects implemented by China, without any direct financing or actual investment from the Chinese side. Some economists have described this model as a form of "disguised borrowing," further binding Iraq to a unilateral partnership without building a parallel domestic economic base.
The agreement was also criticized for its apparent slowness in implementation and lack of practical impact, despite several years having passed since its entry into force. Despite the huge sums announced to be deposited into the special account, the projects actually implemented did not exceed the scope of a single project related to the construction of several schools, which does not live up to the ambitions upon which the agreement was originally based. This slow pace has led many to question the existence of a genuine political will to implement the agreement in an effective and productive manner.
Regarding the geographic distribution of projects, there was a complete absence of declared criteria or a balanced development vision that would ensure fairness among Iraq's governorates. No official framework was announced to clarify how project priorities are determined or how their locations are selected, which sparked discontent among a number of local governments, who viewed this as a continuation of centralized policies and the exclusion of regions not politically connected to centers of influence. This pattern of development exclusion is likely to reproduce the disparities between governorates, rather than contribute to bridging them.
Opportunities and risks
According to development researchers, the Sino-Iraqi agreement embodies a complex combination of opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it offers a real possibility of reshaping Iraqi economic decision-making beyond the traditional dependence on Western centers, by investing oil resources in infrastructure projects that directly address the needs of Iraqi society. On the other hand, however, it could lead to a new type of economic dependency if it is approached outside the framework of financial and institutional sovereignty, or if it lacks sound governance.
The core of the crisis lies not in the structure of the agreement itself or the nature of the partnership with China, but rather in the weak Iraqi political will to implement the agreement within clear legal and institutional frameworks. The lack of transparency, the absence of parliamentary and societal oversight, and the marginalization of the role of experts in the evaluation and follow-up process are all factors that have contributed to the agreement's effective suspension, or, in the opinion of several economic governance researchers, its transformation into a symbolic rather than practical tool.
Accordingly, a number of observers of Iraqi economic policies believe that reevaluating the agreement from a purely technical perspective, away from political rhetoric and propaganda slogans, appears to be an urgent necessity. Such initiatives can only become true tools of change if they are linked to a comprehensive development vision that takes into account the priorities of the governorates, development gaps, and the feasibility of investing in productive sectors.
At the same time, this agreement should be viewed as part of broader geopolitical balances, not as a unilateral alternative to the umbrella of traditional alliances. What is required is not engaging in a new axis at the expense of another, but rather building an independent Iraqi model based on diversifying economic partnerships without compromising national decision-making. This requires Iraqi decision-makers to develop strategic maneuvering tools that protect the country's interests from external pressures and establish multifaceted international cooperation, free from the logic of alignment.
Turkish Minister: We sent Iraq a draft of a new agreement on the oil pipeline.
In a press statement, Bayraktar pointed out that the agreement on the crude oil pipeline between Iraq and Turkey was reached in 1973, adding that construction of the pipeline was completed in 1976, but the pipeline, which has a daily capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day, has not been used at full capacity for nearly 50 years.
Bayraktar emphasized the importance of crude oil pipelines to global supplies, saying, "We say to Iraq: You export 4 million barrels of oil per day. All of this goes through Basra. Here, there is a different route for 1.5 million barrels. You can easily deliver nearly 40 percent of your oil to the world via a different route. You can even reach different markets and geographies like Europe and the Mediterranean."
The Turkish minister explained that the necessary legal steps have been taken, noting that the pipeline agreement, which expires in July 2026, will be automatically extended unless either party provides one year's notice.
He added, "Yes, we could have extended it, but what kind of agreement would we have extended? We would have extended an agreement that did not meet the line's capacity. Unfortunately, we would have extended an agreement that has put us in a legal limbo since 2014, and we would have extended an agreement that would have caused a legal dispute between us."
He continued, "So, we said this agreement is not commercially or legally beneficial. Let's not prolong this. But immediately after that, I sent a letter to my Iraqi counterpart, the Iraqi oil minister, attaching a draft of our new agreement."
He explained: "We said we now want to work on this matter through an agreement on the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. The essence of that agreement is: Let us exploit the full capacity of this pipeline, avoiding any legal disputes between us. Let us allow 1.5 million barrels of oil to flow through it. That is our goal. Furthermore, we discussed the development road project, and it is possible to transform it into an energy road. Today, 1.5 million barrels represents an annual investment of nearly $40 billion."
Asked about extending the pipeline to southern Iraq, Bayraktar said: "To reach a capacity of 1.5 million barrels (per day), this pipeline must extend south. Because it cannot be filled, but only halfway through, with production in the north, including Kirkuk."
Turkish sources told Anadolu Agency last week that Ankara and Baghdad had begun negotiations to reach a more comprehensive agreement for the transport of Iraqi oil.
In this context, a Turkish presidential decree was published in the Official Gazette on Monday, July 21, announcing that the crude oil pipeline agreement between Turkey and Iraq, in effect since 1973, will expire on July 27, 2026.
It is noteworthy that the crude oil pipeline between Iraq and Turkey was operated in accordance with the agreement and related protocols concluded in 1973, and renewed in 2010.
This pipeline has become a symbol of energy ties between the two countries, but changing regional conditions, evolving energy markets, and the growing expectations of both countries have limited the agreement's ability to meet current needs and have also necessitated new commercial, legal, and structural arrangements.
The National Security Council discusses targeting oil fields, securing borders, and foreign workers.
The Ministerial Council for National Security, headed by the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, discussed five files, including attacks on oil facilities and securing the border strip.
The spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Sabah al-Numan, said in a statement received by (Al-Youm Al-Akhbariya), that "Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, chaired today, Wednesday, the periodic meeting of the Ministerial Council for National Security, during which the overall security situation in the country was discussed, the topics on the agenda were considered, and the necessary decisions and recommendations were taken regarding them.
" He added, "During the meeting, the work of the specialized committees in the investigations into the attacks that occurred on oil facilities, vital areas and Iraqi military equipment, including radars, and the attack that occurred recently in one of the agricultural departments near Karkh in Baghdad were followed up."
He continued, "The efforts of our security forces to secure the international borders, monitor fortifications, and reinforce the forces with the necessary requirements were also monitored, to ensure the success of their missions and work. The necessity of coordination and unification of efforts between all security agencies in controlling the border strip with neighboring countries was emphasized. In this regard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces praised the work of the Border Forces Command and other supporting security units."
He explained that "the meeting witnessed a discussion of developing intelligence efforts and adopting modern, advanced technologies and innovative methods in this work, as well as discussing the issue of foreign labor in Iraq and the mechanism for granting entry visas, emphasizing the organization of this labor in a way that does not affect the economic, social and security conditions."
The largest since 2018: US sanctions target 115 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to Iran.
On Wednesday, the United States imposed its largest sanctions package against Iran since 2018, targeting 115 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to a complex network of money laundering, oil smuggling, and arms trafficking.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) confirmed in a statement that these sanctions "are the largest Iran-related sanctions since 2018," targeting a fleet of oil tankers and container ships belonging to Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of Ali Shamkhani, a close advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The sanctions targeted 115 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to Iran, indicating that the Trump administration is intensifying its "maximum pressure" campaign after the bombing of Iran's main nuclear sites last June.
The US Treasury described this move as the most significant Iran-related sanctions measure since 2018, during Trump's first term.
The US Treasury said the network targeted by sanctions "laundered billions of dollars through oil and commodity shipments from Iran and Russia, mostly to China."
"The Shamkhani family has used foreign passports and front companies to conceal its global activities, circumvent sanctions, and amass wealth," it said.
She added that some of the network's ships "were involved in transporting missiles and drone parts to Russia in exchange for Russian oil."
The Treasury Department said Shamkhani controls a vast network of container ships and tankers through a complex network of intermediaries that sell Iranian and Russian oil shipments and other commodities around the world.
The ministry accused Shamkhani of "exploiting his personal connections and corruption in Tehran" to generate tens of billions of dollars in profits, "a significant portion of which is used to support the Iranian regime."
Overall, the new sanctions target 15 shipping companies, 52 vessels, 12 individuals, and 53 entities involved in sanctions evasion in 17 countries around the world.
A US official said the new move would not disrupt global oil markets as it was specifically designed to target specific groups.
It's worth noting that the European Union imposed sanctions on Shamkhani earlier this July, citing his role in the Russian oil trade.
A US official told Reuters that Wednesday's measures will affect both Russia and Iran, but will focus on Tehran.
"From our perspective, given this individual's position, his connection to the Supreme Leader, and his father's past sanctions activities, it is important to emphasize that sanctions on Iran are meaningful and have a significant impact," the official added.
It is noteworthy that the United States targeted Ali Shamkhani, Mohammad Hossein's father, with sanctions in 2020.
Baghdad may waive oil shortfall blocking June budget transfers to Erbil: KRG source
7 hrs ago from this posting
Baghdad may overlook the volume of oil currently being delivered by the Kurdistan Region despite it falling short of the agreed-upon quota, potentially paving the way for the disbursement of June salaries, a source from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) told Rudaw on Wednesday.
“Sending June salaries is tied to oil delivery, but it's possible Baghdad may overlook the amount of oil being delivered, given that current production does not reach 280,000 barrels and it's decided to reach that level gradually,” the source said, on the condition of anonymity.
Under a July 17 agreement approved by Iraq’s Council of Ministers, the KRG is required to deliver 280,000 barrels of oil per day, with 50,000 barrels allocated for domestic use. In return, Baghdad is to send monthly salary payments.
More than 1.2 million civil servants in the Kurdistan Region remain unpaid for June.
Aziz Ahmad, deputy chief of staff to KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, said earlier this month that nearly 200,000 barrels of oil production had been lost due to the “spate of drone attacks.”
A Baghdad technical team is expected to visit oil fields in the Kurdistan Region to assess current production levels and inspect damage from the strikes. A KRG source told Rudaw the delegation had already visited some fields and will now inspect the remaining ones.
Rudaw has recorded dozens of drone and rocket attacks on the Kurdistan Region in recent weeks, many of which targeted oil infrastructure. While no group has claimed responsibility, the KRG interior ministry has accused the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF or Hashd al-Shaabi) of involvement - a charge Baghdad has rejected as “unacceptable.”
Despite these challenges, a source from the oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region told Rudaw on Tuesday that they received a proposal detailing how to produce the 50,000 barrels for domestic use and how their financial entitlements will be paid. According to the deal, companies are to be paid $16 per barrel.
However, Rudaw has learned that firms raised objections over the fixed rate. They want their payments after the initial two-month period to reflect their contractual shares and be linked to market prices, rather than a flat rate.
Beyond oil, non-oil revenue also remains a sticking point. Baghdad has demanded 120 billion dinars in non-oil revenue for both May and June. While that amount has been delivered for May, a KRG source said June’s contribution “will be provided somehow,” but added that the Region “cannot deliver that amount of revenue for July.”
According to Rudaw’s information, a joint committee from both governments’ finance ministries and financial oversight bodies is now tasked with assessing and determining the Region’s actual monthly non-oil revenues. The outcome could change future targets.
Baghdad’s expectations are based on a March 12 report to the prime minister’s office that estimated the Kurdistan Region’s 2024 non-oil revenues at 4.702 trillion dinars, or about 391.8 billion dinars per month. But a KRG finance ministry source told Rudaw the figure is misleading.
“The problem is that the calculated revenue amount has not all been returned to the government in cash. Part of that revenue, such as electricity money, has not been paid by citizens, so it's difficult to deliver the same estimated amount of money,” the source said.
Tensions between Erbil and Baghdad escalated in late May when the federal finance ministry halted budget transfers, accusing the KRG of exceeding its 12.67 percent share and failing to meet oil commitments.
The standoff began to ease earlier this month after Baghdad sent 975 billion dinars (around $737 million) to cover May salaries. But the deal’s implementation has faced delays over unresolved technical and financial details.
The first scenes of the electricity ship promised by Al-Sudani entering Iraqi waters.
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